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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-2-
2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the 
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief 
could be granted. 
Determinative law: 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/04/1999). 
OngIntel, v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992). 
Standard of review: 
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the 
material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving 
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness, 
ceding no deference to the district court. 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007). 
II. Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the 
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief 
could be granted. 
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Determinative law: 
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988). 
Cache County v. Bern, 978 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1999). 
Commercial Investment corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997). 
Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978). 
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehman 's Inc., 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189 
(1990). 
Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. 4/15/04). 
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970). 
Standard of review: 
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the 
material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving 
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness, 
ceding no deference to the district court. 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007). 
The Appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing the 
Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Shaw Res. Ltd., LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell P.C, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 
2006). 
III. Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim of fraud in the 
inducement on the premise, it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief 
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could be granted. 
Determinative law: 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). 
Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981). 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600 (Utah 2003). 
OngIntel v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). 
Smith v. Grand Canyons Expedition Company, 84 P.3d 1154 (Utah 2003 (reh. den. 
2004). 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988). 
Standard of review: 
In reviewing an Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts the 
material allegations in the Complaint as true and interprets those facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving 
party. The appellate court reviews the grant of a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion for correctness, 
ceding no deference to the district court. 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007). 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in finding there were no material issues of disputed fact 
precluding defendant's summary judgment on their counterclaim. 
Determinative law: 
Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). 
Standard of review: 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue 
of material fact, the Appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light 
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most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact issues. 
Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). 
V. Whether the trial court erred in holding that defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment on their counterclaim for unlawful detainer and landlord's remedies as a 
matter of law. 
Determinative law: 
UCA §78-36-1 
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988). 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). 
Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1999). 
Commercial Investment corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997). 
Creerv. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978). 
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehman 's Inc., 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189 
(1990). 
Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981). 
Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. 4/15/04). 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600 (Utah 2003). 
Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/04/1999). 
OngIntel, v. 11'" Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d447 (Utah 1993). 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953). 
Smith v. Grand v. Grand Canyons Expedition Company, 84 P.3d 1154 (Utah 2003) 
(reh. den. 2004). 
Spears v. Warr, 44P.3d 742 (Utah 2002). 
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970). 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992). 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988). 
Standard of review: 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a summary judgment for 
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correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing, the 
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Shaw Res. Ltd, LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell PC, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 2006). 
VI. Whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of damages purportedly owing 
to the defendants. 
Determinative law: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10 
Angelos v. First interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1993). 
Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930). 
Smith v. Linmer Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222 (Utah App. 1990). 
Veli Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Healthcare Fin., 797 P.2d 
438 (Utah App. 1990). 
Standard of review: 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. In so doing, the 
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Shaw Res. Ltdy LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell PC, 142 P.3d 560 (Utah App. 2006). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes and rules are attached 
hereto as Addendum "B". 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on September 
30, 2004. R. 1. Holmes filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on October 25, 2004.R.23. 
A hearing on the motion took place on April 28, 2005. R. 1549. According to the docket 
sheet, on June 29, 200^ Judge Lewis signed an order "re: hrg on 4/28/05, The Court 
dismisses the pla's claims for specific performance and promissory estoppel & permitting 
pla to amend his unjust enrichment claim or to add a new claim". R.171. 
An amended Complaint was filed on August 1, 2005 and Defendants filed a Motion 
to Dismiss on August 23, 2005. R.173, R. 197. On August 26, 2005 Defendants left an 
Answer and Counterclaim with the Court. R.201. The Defendants however failed to pay the 
required filing fee and the Answer and Counterclaim were accordingly not "filed" until 
September 27, 2005. Mr. Truong's answer to the Counterclaim was filed the same day. 
R.394. On November 7, 2005 Holmes filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Attachment in aid of lessor's lien. R.501, R.505. 
On February 1, 2006 the Court heard oral argument on the Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Attachment. R. 1550. At 
the conclusion of the hearing the Court indicated Mr. Truong's personal property was 
subject to attachment and took the remaining matters under advisement. R.1550 pg 40. On 
March 13 Plaintiff posted a cash bond of $150,000.00, with the Court, to effectuate a 
release of any claim of a landlord's lien, and filed a motion requesting the Court to 
establish the correct amount of the bond. Defendants opposed that motion. R.589. On April 
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5, 2006 the Court entered a minute entry wherein it stated it was granting Defendants' 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and for a Writ of Attachment and ordering 
Defendants' counsel to prepare an Order reflecting the Court's ruling. R.600. 
On May 31, 2006 the property was completely vacated and surrendered to the 
Defendants. In July of 2006, Holmes sent a proposed order to Plaintiff. On July 12, 2006 
Plaintiff objected to the form of the proposed order. R.670. On August 31, 2006 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on Supplemental Damages. R.751. 
After the hearing two separate orders, one dealing with an award of damages, the other with 
an award of costs and attorney fees, were entered by the court. R.1022, R.1038. The cost 
and attorney fees judgment was actually entered one day prior to the judgment itself. 
The Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking resolution of the 
remaining claims in defendant's counterclaim against plaintiff. R. 1174. At the hearing on 
the motion, the defendants informed the court that they no longer desired to pursue those 
two claims and the Court accordingly dismissed them, and as there were no longer any 
claims present, denied Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as moot R.l 552. 
The court's final order was dated March 21, 2008 and entered March 24, 2008. 
R.1449. Thereafter this appeal was filed April ] 7, 2008. R.1538. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. In September of 2003, the Plaintiff, Mr. Truong, was approached by a realtor named 
Jack Carnell to see if he was interested in acquiring a building located at 1050 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Complaint. R.831. 
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2 iong was informed that the owners of the property were the Defendants Bruce 
and Joan Holmes, H KM. 
3. The building was in a dilapidated condition and w a-, • > 111« -i w IM nn uitjhli" 1. -i 
Truong's purposes, but the location was desirable. R.831 
4. i -. ( 11 111 i-111111111 g lo sale the premises or to lease it at the rate of 
$3,500.00 per month. R.831. 
5. After a period of negotiations, the parties agreed upon a sale of the property to K lr 
6. After the parties had agreed upon u - lines ikivntiiiial that they needed 
to defer the timing of the sale in order to obtain more favorable capital gains 
i * issues pertaining to tax liens that were present on the 
property. R.832. 
7. Mr. Truong was willing to work with the Holmes to allow them to achie 
goals, K M U. 
8. To that end the realtor Mr. epnv documents 
consisting of a lease and option agreement. R.832. 
9. V\ h. ii I i li I Mi< n}4 asked sr -a: «-:, ^ rgthy agreements he was informed that the 
agreements were mere formali *ssary ( • inn I llii* IK % ^ nteria and that the 
boiler plate provisions would not be enforced. R.832. 
) ""il II I ii ( "!'i .is the intent and understanding of the parties that Mr. Truong was a 
"tenant" only as JI lonii.iliU ,UH I ;.u ,^i; me property to him at the 
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end of September 2004. R.832. 
11. The parties signed the lease and option agreements at the end of September 2003. 
R.832. 
12. At or about the time of execution, Mr. Truong paid the Holmes $90,000.00 
consisting of two checks designated as rent of $60,000.00 and a security deposit of 
$30,000.00. R.832. 
13. Both of these amounts were to be credited towards the purchase price. R.832. 
14. At this time Mr. Carnell was paid a real estate commission for the sale of the 
property. R.832. 
15. During the negotiations for the sale of the property and for periods of time 
thereafter, Mr. Truong and Mr. Holmes discussed the renovations Mr. Truong was 
going to make to the property. R.832. 
16. The renovations included the complete gutting of one structure, down to the four 
walls, and substantial modification to the adjoining office R.832. 
17. Mr. Holmes was aware that Mr. Truong was going to spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to upgrade the property from a dilapidated structure to an attractive and 
viable retail, office and warehouse space. R.832-833. 
18. After the Agreements were in place, Holmes made a demand that Mr. Truong get 
insurance in place on the property. R.833. 
19. Mr. Truong had attempted obtain insurance on the property, but had been unable to 
procure any due to the dilapidated condition the property was in when it was turned 
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over to him. R.833 
i I mi in in ii in ' 1 1 L ! > 11 r 111 renovations to the property. R, 8 3 3. 
The parties thereafter agreed that the polic> of UKUPHU e the 11« iinn^ \\ i< I n Hio 
property would be continued, but that Mr. Truong would pay for that insurance. 
R .833 
In January of 2004 Holmes sent a lctt. 
insurance policy. At that time Mr. Truong was out of the country. R.833. 
I i u i leav nig the country, Mi I ruong had authorized his brother, Andy Truong to 
act on his behalf. Andy I i i i 31 lg, c 11 behalf - ; . : ^ 
the insurance along with a letter notifying Holmes of Mr. Truong's intent to 
exei ci.se the option to purchase the building. R.833, R. 837. 
Holmes admits to recen J e * . 
Thereafter there was little to no communication between the parties until Holmes 
scut a letter on or about August 19, 2003, to Mr. Truong, alleging that Truong had 
failed to send a Notice of intrnl In rxereise (lie oplmn I II liins vufhin sixty days 
of the exercise date, as required under the Option Agreement. R.834. 
]\ iiig immediately contacted Holmes and their counsel and informed them 1le 
was ready to close on the date enni iinei) n illmi 1I1 niid 11 1 I1 ^ ^4. 
Mr. Truong also contacted the attorney who had drafted the lease and option 
agreements and had him contact the Holmes counsel and again affirm Mr Truong's 
abilit} and inki • Hie trim^u'iim 
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28. Holmes rejected Mr. Truong's offer to close. R.834. 
29. This rejection led to the initial action in this case which was filed with the Court on 
September 30, 2004. R.l. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case consists of three separate and distinct areas of contention, dismissal of the 
amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the granting of summary judgments on 
defendant's counterclaims, pursuant to Rule 56, and the amount of damages awarded to the 
defendants as a result of the granting of the two motions. 
In order to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the party opposing the 
motion need only show that he would be entitled to recover under some version of the 
facts. That de minimus threshold is more than adequately met in this case. 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint set forth three causes of action. The Plaintiff plead 
facts sufficient to meet all three causes. Defendants sought to avoid this fact by alleging 
they have affirmative defenses that will defeat the claims in the complaint. The test under 
Rule 12(b)(6) does not however allow a venture into purported affirmative defenses. The 
issue is solely whether the "Complaint" states a cause of action on which relief could be 
granted. Even if the court were to have looked at the "affirmative defenses" the facts as 
plead by the Plaintiff, if accepted as true as required by the rule, still defeat those purported 
defenses. The trial court's ruling dismissing the amended complaint was incorrect and has 
created a serious injustice. 
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of material 
-11-
•JL: I nummary judgment is entitled to judgiik-nl a^  a matter \ f law. 
Snyder w Merkley, 693 P 2d. OH- yiyc li >< ills \\ lira in i Iratiy .ippcns Ih.u ihr pmtv 
against whom the judgment would be granted can't possible establish a right to recover 
idgment be granted, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of such a 
party when summary judgment against -u,ur-n f undture 
Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah .M '" I 1 W I" M 
ill! 11 '(>> i In considering a motion, the court must "view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn there(rot11 111 • • - he non-moving party." Carrier v. 
Sail Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004). It only takes one sworn st^cnini! lo 
dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding 
summary judgment, Holhr\>ok i'unwtww i Liiims ip i m MH IIW I | . 
Summary Judgment was given to the Defendants in uii^ n ^ 11 i n 
acceptance of the Defendants' affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, n 
Plaintiff is i? e.::r« * ....J o IK in unlawful detainer 
thereof. The dismissal of the Amended Complaint is therefore mextrieiil lv ivhleel I', (lie 
grant of summary judgment. Reversal of the dismissal accordingly requires the reversal of 
the summary jud^ in*Mil ;is well 
Examining the affirmative defenses discloses that Plaintiff ple^i l • * • • t 
accepted as IIUL vould defeat the affirmative defenses. These facts were set forth in sworn 
affidavit was accordingly obligated to deny the 
summary judgment motion, but it failed to do so. 
^ 2 -
Examining the argument of the Plaintiff, it likewise becomes clear that neither the 
Defendants or the trial court addressed the equitable relief requested by the plaintiff. This 
relief consists in part of the "Doctrine of Substantial Compliance" which has been accepted 
by Utah Courts and which, by its very nature, creates a jury question not susceptible to 
determination through summary judgment. 
Finally the plaintiff pointed out that where a party seeks a forfeiture that party must 
comply strictly with the provisions which it seeks to enforce. As demonstrated by the 
Plaintiff, Defendants failed to comply with the very agreements under which they seek to 
cheat the Plaintiff. As a matter of law that result should not be confirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT. 
A. Standard of Review 
Motions for judgment on the pleadings are not favored by the courts, and when 
made great liberality in construing the assailed pleading should be allowed. Harman v. 
Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P.2d 352 (1941). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim challenges a plaintiffs entitlement to relief under the facts alleged or under any state 
of facts that could be proved to support the claim. Patterson v. American Fork City, 61 
P.3d 466 ( Utah 2003). If there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for 
lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the part/ an opportunity 
to present its proof. Ho v. Jim's Enterprises, Inc., 29 P.3d 633 (Utah 2001). In ruling on a 
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• ^ . » M.iLcto state a claim, a court must construe the claims in the light 
most ia\orabic to the plaintiff am rcnees -.n n^ la\<u, Mounteer 
v Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Whenviewnl in hniil m ihr.r 
l^.inilanl.s, il'n i i mi I . dismissal of the complaint is plainly in error. 
Z. I HE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES SI JITK 'IEi IT FACTS TO SUPPORT 
ALL OF ITS CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sets forth three causes of action, which are plead in 
the .ilttTiLinii MI II ( luiiiiM ,iit I'tii I! . Hit! iii the Inducement, Specific Performance and 
Unjust Enrichment. All Plaintiff is seeking is flu; n tn ./mail -i I he at lua I bargain 
between the parties as opposed to Defendants attempt to exploit what they obvious 
i " "i <»ft h «lt/ fi'iMA in,4 Niein no take outrageous advantage of the Plaintiff. As will be 
shown below, the Amended Complaint sels luilh .uinjiuir Lid -, i<> support all three causes 
of action. 
1. r >rth Adequate Facts To Show Fraud in the Inducement 
As set forth in the Amended Complaint thr P'.nliu/ „ n/iik i ol iiid«,i Real Instate 
Purchase Contract. At Defendant's request, Plaintiff did not close the transa ? 
terms deferred the acquisition of the property for one year. That 
deferral, and surrender of the right to immediate < m nrrslui» 'n ,i-, lu.uli n the reasonable 
reliance that Plaintiff would receive title to the property the next year. Plaintiff has 
sprnfinillv -n en I ii ii In u ,i» lold. prior to executing the lease and purchase option, by 
the Defendants, that the lease and purchase «»pi i- >i» " « ", ,i mere tormality and that the boiler 
plate provisions of the documents would not be enforced. See Amended Complaint ^29. 
In reliance on that promise, Plaintiff spent Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 
renovating the property for his use. After the Defendants received $90,000.00 in cash and 
the property itself had been vastly improved, they sought to keep all the money and the 
property too. With the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Defendants' 
counterclaim they were awarded an even greater cash windfall for their bad faith actions. 
Defendants alleged that the claim for fraudulent inducement was not plead with 
sufficient specificity. That simply is not true. The allegations in the Amended Complaint 
set forth the specific misrepresentations that were made, that they were made by the 
Defendants, that they were made prior to execution of the contracts at issue and that the 
Plaintiff relied upon those representations both in the manner in which he upgraded the 
property and in the manner in which he followed the dictates of the boiler plate in the 
agreements. The purpose of the pleading rules is to afford the parties fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim being made. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 
P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint far exceeds the basics required. 
Defendants next argued that a fraud in the inducement claim is barred because the 
agreements they fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign contain language precluding the 
introduction of parol evidence of those misrepresentations. This very issue was addressed 
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 
11/4/1999). In that case the Court held: "Moreover, parol evidence is admissible to prove 
that a party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an 
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integrated contract." 
^dressing this issue the Court has also held " An integration clause may prevent 
enforcement of prior ur rontemp' i( mrous agreeniriih', I he •.. * ... iocs not 
prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a party to the contract, or of illegality 
accident, or mistake...Paper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements of fact to 
be true wt v * > *;u.-t < <Ui, \farketing, 
Ltd, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). 
I he Court of Appeals defined the types of mistake it was referring to: 
First, if the instrument does not embody the intentions of both parties to the 
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if 
one party is laboring under a mistake about a contract term and that mistake either 
has been induced by the other party or is known by and conceded to by the other 
party, then the inequitable nature of the other party's conduct will have the same 
operable effect as a mistake... 
Llo) >d's Unlimited at 512. 
In determining the effect of the misrepresentations, the < 
invalidate only those portions of the agreement that are problematical as a result of the 
fraudulri ( iinliii i iiiniiL In IIK iiisLm! i ,i,r thr ( mni need t m ly hold that the nonessential 
terms of the contract such as the timing of the notice of intent to exmist,"" ilir opium, ih • 
bonding requirements etc, are not enforceable. There would still exist sufficient written 
agreement betwtvn iiir |i,utn" v in iiu. |im|K'iiy in IH .HM, the parties to the transaction, 
the price and the time the transaction was to close. Consequently i Jofendunt. r\ m i in . 
with the statute of frauds are eliminated. 
1111s c,isi: I i 111s1111y iJ i s11• ihii• I n.in 11)e cases, cited by Defendants to the trial court, 
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because it involves a series of written agreements between the parties. The only necessity 
is for the Court to determine what the actual tenns were to be and to do that the Court is 
supposed to consider fraud in the inducement and the parol evidence that establishes the 
claim. 
2. Plaintiffs Complaint Sets Forth Sufficient Facts For A Claim For Specific 
Performance. 
"[R]eal property is assumed to be unique for purposes of specific performance and 
... specific performance is the presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to sell real 
property." Knighton v. Bowers, WL 797560 (Utah App. Apr. 15, 2004). In its initial 
Complaint, Plaintiff sought to rely on the parties intent and Plaintiffs oral affirmation of 
his exercise of the option. The Defendant's moved to Dismiss the original complaint 
arguing the contracts between the parties were unambiguous and integrated and that they 
required notice of intent to exercise the option to be made in writing. 
After oral argument on the motion, but prior to the court's ruling, Plaintiff 
discovered a writing that gave notice of the intent to exercise the option. That writing, 
which was not addressed by the Court in its prior ruling, forms the basis of the claim for 
specific performance here.1 
Defendants raise several objections to the use of the letter to exercise the option. 
The first objection is that the Option could not be exercised because the Plaintiff was in 
Default under the terms of the lease. The purported defaults consisted of failing to place 
1
 A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit UC" to the amended Complaint.R.196. 
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insurance on the property, the Plaintiffs alleged making of unauthorized improvements on 
(In. piiipL'iKj'l.iiuiill > l.nlwu. 1.1 obtain a performance and completion bond, and 
Plaintiffs failure to pay the real property taxes. 
Paragraph 10. Of the lease required the Defendant to give written notice of any 
alleged default in the lease before it could take any legal action based thereon. Prior to the 
letter exercising the option, the only written notice of default was with respect to the 
insurance. R.42-43. That alleged defect was cured at the time the letter exercising the 
, , n was sent i ;;c setter contained the demanded payment and the insurance would have 
been in place lor ,1 period ol nine past ihe escn ise date." 
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides in pertinent part "Notwithstanding 
anything else herein, this option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured 
material default undo i lln I CIM" W huh i, altat Iml liulie, i <plion Agreement as an 
Exhibit" (emphasis added). R.55. "Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the 
nonfulfillment of which excuses performance, depends upon the intent of the parties, to be 
ascertained from a fan .mil n .• -.< >n,alili i M.I in,. |i,,ii ul lln language used in light of all llie 
circumstances when they executed the contract" Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, u i 
(Illah I'VS) 
The Construction is complete I'IMT" '••' n" neid I 'i . i lv in. I hiillu'ininie il 
Defendants had closed as they agreed, any need for such a bond would have been 
2
 It is important to note that the Defendants cashed the check accompanying the letter which 
cured the purported default relating to the insurance. 
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completely obviated. The bond provision is clearly not ^material" in a fashion that would 
have prevented the exercise of the Option. The bond is simply a mechanism to protect the 
property owner from mechanic's lien claims and or waste to the property. With the 
transfer of ownership to the Plaintiff, all such risk would have passed to him as well. 
The Defendants knew exactly what construction Plaintiff was undertaking on the 
property. Even after the construction was complete no objection was made as to the scope 
or nature of the renovations. It is only when the Defendants look to find a way to reap an 
unjust windfall by keeping the property that they first raise this issue as an excuse for their 
failure to perform. 
With respect to the property taxes, again the taxes would not have become due for 
2004 until after transaction would have closed. If the transaction closed, responsibility for 
payment of the taxes would have fallen solely on the owner of the property. Therefore 
performance of this condition, even if there had been proper notice of default, was not a 
"material" breach. 
The Defendants' failure to insist on adherence to the precise terms of the contract, 
combined with their failure to give any notice of their intention to insist on strict 
compliance with the terms of the contract, is ample evidence that they waived strict 
compliance with the contractual terms. Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah 
App 1988). 
The second objection to the exercise of the option is that it constitutes an improper 
modification of the agreements, because of its reference to other conversations between 
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the parties. This argument is irrelevant for purposes of the specific performance claim. 
I' (i, it claim i s i1-; imp I \' 111 i 11 Hi e I c Iter comprises the required notice under paragraph 3 of the 
Option. 
The third complaint is that he exercise of the option fails under the statute of frauds 
because it is unsigned I his argument is specious. The original of the document was signed 
and sent to the Defendar _ is a copy 
because the original is in the possession of the Defendants. Hie letter was signed. 
1 in (lien i io re the letter does not in and of itself transfer any real property. It simply states 
that Plaintiff is willing mid ;ihlr in |nrfnim under the h n is nil Ifie option when and if the 
Defendants can perform. 
The next complaint is that the Amended Complaint does not contain an allegation 
that Andy Truong ^ . u omp„tint 
speculate as to each and every affirmative defense or counter allegation that will be mad*/ 
by a Defendant It is sufficient that it provide adequate notice of the claims that are being 
made. And\ Irunnv W?K •uithmved Hi iinm u i I 11 1 iruong's behalf. R.833. 
During this period of time David Truong was traveling outside the country. Prior to le,ri in* 
lie atjilionzeil his brother to act on his behalf. R.833. 
The final complaint ^ •:-.....> aragraph J o( 
the Option Agreement simply requires notice of intent to pay the purchase price » ithin Hie 
Option Exercise period. I he letter does exactly that. The actual exercise of the option 
would have liken pliitv ,il Hie Lilei d.ile, but llie I »elc«idants refused to fulfill their 
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obligations to close. 
3. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint Sets Forth The Necessary Facts For A Claim 
of Unjust Enrichment. 
"A proper claim for unjust enrichment requires that the party show (1) a benefit 
conferred on one person by another, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
conferee of the benefit, and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the 
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain 
the benefit without payment of its value." 
Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Company, 84 P.3d 1154,1162 (Utah 2003)( reh den. 
2004), 
In this case Defendants received a benefit from the Plaintiff on three different 
levels. The first benefit is in the initial money received from the Plaintiff totaling 
$90,000.00. The Second benefit was in the dramatic improvement of the property through 
the construction of hundred of thousands of dollars of improvements. The final benefit was 
conferred through the trial court's award of rents and unlawful detainer damages. 
The Defendants knew of the receipt of the cash and know of the value of the 
improvements, which has fueled their attempt to cheat the Plaintiff. Under 1he facts of this 
case it would clearly be inequitable for Defendants to receive this windfall without paying 
for it. 
Defendants argue that because leasehold improvement were governed under the 
Lease, there can be no claim for unjust enrichment. This is not true. The clauses cited by 
Defendants equate to a liquidated damages clause. When the enforcement of a "forfeiture 
provision would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable 
relationship to the actual damage suffered, it becomes unenforceable," Hutcheson v. 
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Gleave, 632 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1981). See Also Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
P.2d446 (1952): Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 
(Utah 1988); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1096 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, for a contract to bar damages under quantum meruit it must be an 
"enforceable contract" regarding the subject matter. The first key element required in 
establishing a contract is a meeting of the minds. Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602 
(Utah 2003) ("It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract.") Plaintiffs view is that the option 
and lease agreement, as drafted, constituted a mere accommodation to the Defendants to 
allow them favorable tax benefits by deferring the closing on the property. Defendants now 
claim that the option and lease agreement are "integrated" contracts abrogating their 
obligation to sell to the Plaintiff under the terms of the REPC. If this was Defendants' 
belief at the time of the execution of the documents there was no meeting of the minds and 
there was no contract at all. Id.3 
The existence of a written document, purporting to be an integrated agreement and 
appearing to be valid on its face, does not constitute a valid contract even where drafted by 
the party alleging the agreement to be invalid if the party is fraudulently induced into 
entering into the agreement. OngInternational (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 
3
 In the alternative the Court could reform the contract to meet the parties intentions allowing 
Plaintiff to purchase the property. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 
507, 511 (Utah App. 1988). 
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P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Here the Plaintiff was induced to surrender his rights to immediate 
title and possession of the property, pursuant to the REPC, in return for a promise that he 
would be able to get such possession in the following year. He was led to believe that the 
option and lease agreement were merely accommodations for the benefit of the 
Defendants. If such is the case he should be allowed to buy the property if such is not the 
case then the representations were fraudulent and the option and lease agreement are void. 
Because the provisions themselves are unenforceable the Court can and should 
consider the considerable unjustified windfall reaped by the Defendants. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of material 
fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P 2d. 64 (1984). Only where it clearly appears that the party 
against whom the judgment would be granted can't possible establish a right to recover 
should summary judgment be granted, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of such a 
party when summary judgment against him is being considered. Reliable Furniture 
Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d. 211, 398 P 2d. 
685 (1965). In considering a motion, the court must "view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Carrier v., 
Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 Utah 2004). It only takes one sworn statement to 
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dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding 
summary judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P 2d. 191 (1975). Where the party 
making the motion does not support his or her motion with competent sworn testimony or 
other admissible evidence, the party opposing the motion is entitled to rely on his 
contradictory pleadings. Parrish v. Lay ton City Corp,, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
B. Issues of Material Fact Preclude Granting Summary Judgement 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, the Appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact 
issues. Neiderhouser Builder & Dev. Corp, v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 
1992). 
The Defendants' arguments in favor of their original Motion for Summary Judgment 
rely on affirmative defenses made in opposition to the Amended Complaint. As will be 
demonstrated below there exist issues of material fact precluding a finding in favor of these 
defenses. 
1. Statute of Frauds 
While the Statue of Frauds requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing, 
exceptions to the Statute exist where there has been part performance. Spears v. Warr, 44 
P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). This argument was examined in detail by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953). In Ravarino the Court 
-24-
stated: 
As stated by this court in Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Hershel Gold Min. Co., 103 
Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1097, the policy considerations underlying the 
doctrines of part performance and estoppel are indistinguishable: " Whether the 
legal label given to the basis of the plaintiffs' claimed right to continue in 
possession of the property is equitable estoppel, irrevocable license, or an oral 
contract for a written extension taken out of the statute of frauds because of partial 
performance is not so important. These concepts are but forms designed to serve a 
more ultimate principle that no one shall induce another to act on promise of reward 
for such act and then after obtaining the benefit of the same repudiate the contract." 
The thesis is given further weight by this court in Bamberger Co. v. Certified 
Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194 48 P.2d 489, 492: "As stated by Mr. Justice 
Cardozo, then justice of the Court of Appeals of New York, in Imperator Realty Co. 
v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263,266: "Sometimes the resulting disability has 
been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. cWe need not go into the 
question of the accuracy of the description.' The truth is that we are facing a 
principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, one with roots in the 
yet larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his own 
inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. The statute of frauds was not intended 
to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle of justice." 
Ravarino at 574 FN1. 
Plaintiff surrendered specific rights under the signed REPC agreement as a favor to 
the Defendants. Those rights were abandoned only on the specific promise that the 
property would be sold to Plaintiff in 2004. In reliance on that promise, Plaimtiff entered 
into the Lease agreement and made significant modifications and renovations to the 
property. Plaintiffs abandonment of existing rights and his substantial performance 
removes this case from the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff set forth his position as to 
Defendants representations and his reliance thereon in his affidavit filed in opposition to 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accepting those representations as true, as 
required when they are the representations of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, the Plaintiff set forth a valid claim for relief under the doctrine of estoppel and 
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his performance defeated the Holmes' defense of the Statute of Frauds. 
2. Integration Clause 
Defendants also sought to preclude any parol evidence relating to the parties 
intentions in entering into the lease and option agreement on the basis of the integration 
clause contained in the lease and option agreement entered into by the parties. 
In Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 33244735 (Utah App. 11/4/1999) the Court held: 
"Moreover, parol evidence is admissible to prove that a party was induced into a contract by 
fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an integrated contract." 
In addressing this issue the Court has also held " An integration clause may prevent 
enforcement of prior or contemporaneous agreements on the same subject, but "does not 
prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a party to the contract, or of illegality, 
accident, or mistake...Paper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements of fact to 
be true when they are actually untrue." Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, 
Ltd, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals defined the types of mistake it was referring to: 
First, if the instrument does not embody the intentions of both parties to the 
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if 
one party is laboring under a mistake about a contract term and that mistake either 
has been induced by the other party or is known by and conceded to by the other 
party, then the inequitable nature of the other party's conduct will have the same 
operable effect as a mistake... 
Lloyd's Unlimited at 512. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff set forth his understanding of the facts relating to the 
execution and effect of the agreements and their provisions in paragraphs 9-13 of his 
affidavit. Accepting those facts as true eliminated the defense of the integration clause, 
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disputing those facts creates issues of material fact precluding summary judgment 
C. Plaintiff Should Be Allowed to Purchase the Property under the Doctrine of 
Substantial Compliance. 
Defendants position in this case is that in order for Plaintiff to acquire the property 
he needed, according to the agreement, to give notice of his intent to exercise the option 
sixty days prior to the exercise date and to be in full compliance with all terms of the lease 
at the time the notice was given. Defendants claim that notice was not given until the letter 
from Mr. Ziter, which would have been 30 days late, and that the letter was invalid anyway 
because Plaintiff was in violation of the lease agreement requiring maintenance of 
insurance, filing of a construction bond and payment of property taxes. 
Plaintiffs position is that he gave oral representations that he was going to exercise 
the option to Mr. Holmes prior to the sixty day deadline, that written notice in the form of 
the letter from Andy Truong, Mr. Truong's brother was given prior to the sixty day period 
and further that delivery of the notice thirty days prior to the agreed upon closing date 
constituted substantial compliance. Defendants' argument results in a "forfeiture". 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of forfeitures in Commercial 
Investment Corp., v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (UT App. 1997) there the Court stated: "We 
begin with the well established principles that although parties are free to contractually 
provide for an enforceable forfeiture provision forfeitures are not favored in the law. The 
undesirability of forfeiture is well-stated by the legal maxim that "the law abhors 
forfeiture". Commercial Investment Corp. at 1109 (citations omitted). 
In U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867 (1970) the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed an issue very similar to the one here at bar. U-Beva had 
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entered into a lease agreement which contained a provision for the termination of the lease 
if there was a breach of any of the lease conditions which were not cured within sixty days 
of notice of the breach. U-Beva had failed to make a $95.00 tax payment. Toledo sent U-
Beva notice of the breach. U-Beva failed to pay the tax until three weeks after the 60 day 
notice period had expired and Toledo claimed that under the terms of the lease the lease 
was therefore terminated. 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that although the payment was three weeks late, it 
would be inequitable to allow a forfeiture for a late payment of $95 when Toledo 
had already expended $55,000.00 pursuing other lease provisions. Specifically, the 
court held: 
We are constrained to believe, and so conclude, that in equity Toledo is relieved 
from any departure here on the grounds that the defection was so minor as to invoke 
the offices of equity, and that at law substantial compliance with the contract, under 
the circumstances, would purge an erstwhile default under a generally accepted 
policy against forfeiture, and that otherwise, there would be an unconscionability 
heretofore condemned by us, justifying the invocation of equitable principles 
restricting even the freedom of contracting improvidently. U-Beva at 869. 
Cache County v. Bern, 978 P.2d 1043, 1048 (Utah App. 1999). 
The Utah Court of Appeals cited with approval to the Arizona case of Foundation 
Development Corp. v. Loehmann 's9 Inc. 163 Ariz. 438, 788 P.2d 1189 (1990) where that 
court stated: 
An overwhelming majority of courts has concluded, without reference to a specific 
statutory provision, that a lease may not be forfeited for a trivial or technical breach 
even where the parties have specifically agreed that "any breach" gives rise to the 
right of termination. 
These courts note the sophistication and complexity of most business interaction 
and are concerned, therefore, that the possibilities for breach of a modern 
commercial lease are virtually limitless. In their view, the parties to the lease did 
not intend that every minor or technical failure to adhere to complicated lease 
provisions could cause forfeiture. Accordingly nearly all courts hold that, regardless 
-28-
of the language of the lease, to justify forfeiture, the breach must be ''material/' 
"serious," or substantial." 
Cache County at 1049-1050. 
In order to determine whether a breach is ' 'material" the Court of Appeals required 
reference to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which states the fact finder should 
look at 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent 
to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure 
his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to 
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Circumstances Significant in Determining 
Whether A Failure is Material § 241 (1981). 
Cache County at 1050. 
If the Court were to ignore the verbal notifications and the written notification of 
Andy Truong and accept only the notification sent by Mr. Ziter, a weighing of the factors in 
the Restatement clearly holds in favor of Mr. Truong. (a) The reasonable value the Holmes 
could expect from the contract was the option price. Irrespective of the delay in notice 
they would have received it in full, (b) By terminating the option Mr. Truong receives no 
compensation for the $190,000.00+ he spent in renovating the property, he received only 
the benefit of the time of the rental which, prior to Mr. Truong's renovations was 
$3,500.00 per month against his payment of $90,000.00 in rents and deposits, (c) The 
enforcement of the provision as requested by Defendants results in a complete forfeiture, 
(d) Mr. Truong, if he was previously in default, completely cured the default through Mr. 
Ziter's notice; and (e) There is no evidence that Mr. Truong's actions were in any fashion 
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failing to comport with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
The facts as presented provide a clear case for the granting of summary judgment to 
Plaintiff on this issue, at a bare minimum they create issues of material fact that should 
have been addressed by the jury. 
D. Holmes Failure to Give Proper Notice Dooms Their Claims for Lease 
Termination. 
In order to forfeit a purchaser's rights under a purchase contract, the seller must 
strictly comply with the notice provisions of the contract. Commercial Investment Corp., 
v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah App. 1997). Under paragraph 10 of the lease, 
before a forfeiture can take place there must be a written notice of the breach to the 
breaching party, the notice must identify the breach with specificity, must identify what 
must be done to remedy the breach and must give the breaching party five days to remedy 
the breach. At the time Mr. Truong gave notice of his intention to exercise the option 
there were no outstanding breaches upon which notice had been given. Furthermore, the 
cure of any material breaches was only to take place prior to exercise of the option, not the 
notice of the option as Defendants have been arguing. Defendants "notices" of default 
under the lease were not served until long after the option would have been exercised. 
Accordingly they can provide no basis for denying Plaintiff the right to acquire the 
property. 
III. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR REQUESTED DAMAGES 
A. Defendants Were Improperly Awarded A Double Recovery. 
"The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its 
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single 
wrong." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983). In the lease 
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agreement, the parties agreed to the penalty for a hold over beyond the termination of the 
lease. In Paragraph 21 of the lease it states: 
If LESSEE shall hold over without the consent of the LESSOR, express or implied, 
then LESSEE shall be construed to be a tenant at sufferance at double the Rent 
herein provided prorated by the day until possession is returned to LESSOR. 
R.49. 
Pursuant to the Lease agreement, Rent was set at $5,000.00 per month. R.46. 
Defendants elected a remedy of double rents for any hold over period as opposed to any 
other available remedies. 
In their claim for damages Defendants have requested treble damages for the period 
of time form November 2005 through May 2006. In their claim for supplemental damages 
Defendants attempt to use the unlawful detainer statute as opposed to the contract damages. 
Their attempt however is misplaced. In their execution of the contract Defendants 
specifically elected their remedy for damages if Plaintiff held over. That election was for 
double the regular rent rate. The total due for holdover rents is accordingly 810,000.00 per 
month, from the end of the lease, prorated to the time the Plaintiff left the building. 
B. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Treble Damages. 
Defendants were granted treble damages under the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute. 
UCA §78-36-10. Subsections (2) and (3) of this section provides: 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of 
the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in te 
complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the 
payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 
through 78-38-16. 
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(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times 
the amount of damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 2(c), and for 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
1. Defendants have suffered no damages. 
Pursuant to UCA §78-36-10 (2) damages are to be awarded where Defendants have 
suffered some damage as a result of an unlawful detainer. The reality here is that 
Defendants suffered no damage. In 2003, when Plaintiff took possession of the property, 
the County Assessor valued the property at $332,150.00. In 2005, after Plaintiffs 
improvements, the market value of the property was $982,660.00.4 The dramatic increase 
in the property's value, because of Mr. Truong's improvements, highlights Defendants' 
unwillingness to go through with the sale and clearly demonstrates they have suffered no 
damages. 
2. Rent damages are not subject to trebling. 
Under the plain language of the statute "rent" is not to be trebled. UCA §78-36-
10(3). Rent in this case began with the inception of the lease and terminated at the earlier 
of (a) the time of the Judgment being entered, (b) termination of the lease (UCA§ 78-36-
10 (1)) or Plaintiffs surrender of the premises to Defendants. Since the surrender took 
place prior to the Court's order, only rents, not damages, have accrued. 
As set forth in the express language of the statute, rent is not an item of damage that 
can be trebled. Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930). Since the lease agreement 
covered a two year period and provided a set amount for rents for any holdover period, 
4
 A copy of the County tax records showing market value for 2003 and 2005 are attached as 
Exhibit "D" to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary judgment on Supplemental Damages. 
R. 800. 
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there can be no trebling of rents.D 
C. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Their Claimed Interest. 
Defendants were awarded interest on unpaid rents from 10/1/04 to 7/31/05 and on 
purported hold over rents from that time forward. Defendants are claiming interest under 
UCA §15-1-1. This section "does nothing more than define what the rate of mterest should 
be in those instances where interest accrues as a matter of law but no specific rate has been 
agreed to; it does not create a right to interest where none exists." Vali Convalescent and 
Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 
1990). The contract does not provide for any interest. It does however provide for a 
specific penalty for a hold over. Such a penalty provision of a necessity contains an 
element of interest in its calculation. 
Even if there were a legal basis for prejudgment interest on the unpaid rents, "a court 
can award prejudgment interest only when the loss is fixed at a particular time and the 
amount can be fixed with accuracy." Smith v. Linmar Energy Corporation, 790 P.2d 1222, 
1225 (Utah App. 1990). To the extent Defendants are claiming treble damages, said 
amounts are only awardable upon ruling of the court. By its nature, a claim for treble 
damages is incomplete until the issue has been ruled on. 
...where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damages must be ascertained 
and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial and in such cases prejudgment interest 
is not allowed. 
Id at 1226 (emphasis in original). 
5The fair market rental value of the property might be used a measure of damages. 
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Defendants have been awarded interest on a principle amount greater than that 
allowed by law ( see election of remedies argument above). They also received interest on 
unlawful detainer damages which are by their very nature unliquidated until entry of the 
Court's order awarding them, the award of such interest must therefore be reversed. 
D. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Their Claimed Attorney Fees. 
The trial court awarded Defendants $42, 695.01 in attorney fees. There is 
insufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness, recoverability or necessity of those 
fees. 
"Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by statute or by contract." Paul 
DeGroot Bldg. Servs., LLC v. Gallacher, 112 P.3d 490 (Utah 2005). Accordingly it 
behooves the party requesting the fees to provide a break down on what fees are purportedly 
being recovered under which method. 
In Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the denial of an award for attorney fees to a prevailing party where the party failed to 
adequately separate noncompensable and compensable claims. Jensen at 349. The Court 
cited with approval Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52,54 (Utah 1998) stating: 
Further, the party requesting the attorney fees must categorize the time and fees 
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement of 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement to attorney fees. 
Jensen at 349. 
In Defendants fees break down they list gross amounts and billing dates, but fail to 
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indicate what work was performed to justify such billings. Even a cursory examination of 
the facts of this case demonstrate however that the amount of the fees exceed those 
recoverable. In the second affidavit of Bruce Holmes he states in paragraph 8 that a notice 
to quit or pay rent was served on or after August 9, 2005. Since such a notice is a 
prerequisite to any action for unlawful detainer, no attorney fees, unrelated to that notice 
would have been awardable under the unlawful detainer statute until after that date. 
Defendant is seeking fees also under the lease agreement. However, no claim was made for 
a breach of the lease prior to the filing of the Answer and Counterclaim on August 26, 
2005. Fees incurred prior to that date were for defending against Plaintiffs claims raised 
under the option agreement. The option agreement does not contain an attorney fees 
provision. 
Even if we were to presume that all of the fees post July were in some fashion 
covered by either the Statute or the Lease Agreement, which would not be appropriate as 
clearly a significant portion must have gone to defeating the new claims under the option 
brought in the amended complaint, that still leaves a minimum of $12,756.00 in fees 
purportedly incurred on issues where no fees are recoverable. 
In light of Defendants failure to properly set forth the fees actually recoverable 
and/or to provide sufficient detail to allow the court to make such a determination all such 
fees should be denied. 
E. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Credit For His Security Deposit 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff paid to the Defendants a "security deposit" of 
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$30,000.00. Defendants however have failed to give Plaintiff credit for this $30,000.00. 
Applying the deposit at the outset of the alleged default would provide sufficient rents for a 
six month period under the original lease or at a minimum for three months under the hold 
over provisions. It would likewise impact the award of any prejudgment interest. 
To fail to account for the $30,000.00 deposit is to award the Defendants a double 
recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to defeat a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff needs only to show that could 
recover under some set of the plead facts. That de minimus threshhold was easily reached 
in this case. The grant of Defendants' motion to Dismiss was accordingly in error. 
The Counterclaim relies entirely on the dismissal of the complaint as a condition 
precedent to its viability. Since the motion to dismiss was improper, the grant of summary 
judgment was likewise improper. 
Additionally, as shown above, there are numerous issues of material fact which are 
in dispute. It only requires the existence of one such fact to preclude the grant of summary 
judgment. Accordingly the summary judgment should be vacated. 
Finally, the trial courts award of damages is excessive both as to actual damages and 
as to interest and fees. With the reversal of the summary judgment, this issue becomes 
somewhat moot. If however the judgment were upheld, The plaintiff respectfully requests 
any award be adjusted according to the argument above. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2008 
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LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & EIH1NGTON 
Shawn D. turner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of October, 2008 a true and correct copy of 
Brief of Appellant and an accompanying searchable electronic copy was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Steven W. Call 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Ste. 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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& NEBBCER 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE) TRUONGi 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, 
JOAN W. HOLMES and 
JOHN DOES 1-5. , 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES, 
COSTS, AND AMOUNT OF BOND 
Case No. 040920717 
Judge: Leslie Lewis 1 
This matter has come before the Court on the following motions: 
1. Defendant Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes' (collectively, the "Holmes") Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages; 
2. Plaintiff David Traong's ("Mr. Ttoung") Motion to Set Bond & Notice of Filing of 
Bond; and 
3. Mr. Truong's Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond. 
The Court having reviewed the motions and having heard oral arguments, concludes as follows; 
This case involves a dispute over a lease agreement with an option to purchase. On 
November 15,2006, this Court signed a written order granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of the Holmes. The order constituted a final judgment in the case and determined that Mr. 
Truong had forfeited all interest in the lease and that he was liable in unlawful detainer for 
having failed to vacate the leased premises upon termination of the lease. Il*e Court also 
granted a partial money judgment as well as a judgment for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. 
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motions now before the Court are made in connection with post-judgment matters. The Court 
will address each motion in tunx 
I. Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages 
On August 31,2006, the Holmes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental 
Damages, The Court heard arguments on the motion on November 15, 2006 and granted the 
motion in all respects except for the matter of attorney fees and costs, which the Court took under 
advisement. The Court now addresses the Holmes' request for attorney fees and costs. The 
Holmes? request for attorney fees and costs is based on the lease agreement and on Utah Code 
Arm. § 78-27-56.5. 
Mr. Troung contends in his opposition memorandum that the Holmes are only entitled to 
attorney fees for work performed on the Holmes' claims for breach of lease and unlawful 
detainer* Mr. Truong points out that the Holmes' claim for breach of the lease did not occur until 
the Holmes filed their Answer and Counterclaim on August 26,2005. Therefore, Mr. Truong 
contends that the Holmes cannot recover any attorney fees prior to August 26,2005 and that the 
Holmes must separate the compensable and non-compensable claims after that date. The Court 
disagrees. 
In this case, Mr. Truong1 s original complaint alleged that the Holmes had breached the 
option agreement. However, the option agreement was attached as an addendum to the lease and 
therefore a part of it As such, the litigation over the option agreement should be covered by the 
2 
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fee provision in the lease agreement Alternatively, even if the fee provision in the lease does 
not directly apply to the option agreement, under Utah law, parties are entitled to attorney fees 
when compensable and non-compensable claims overlap. See Dejavue Jhc„ v. US Energy 
Corp., 1999 UT App> 355 f 21, 993 P>2d 222 (affirming trial court's fee award because contract 
counterclaim and tort claim were based on related legal theories involving common core of 
facts). 
In this case, the entire litigation has been based on the same nucleus of facts surrounding 
the lease and option agreement, Indeed, in the Holmes1 original motion to dismiss, one of the 
Holmes* successful arguments was that Mr. Truong could not exercise the option agreement 
because he was in default under the lease. The lease and option agreement were attached 
together and the dispute in this case has primarily been whether the lease or the option agreement 
is the controlling document The Court has concluded that the lease is the controlling document 
To the extent that there are claims separable from the breach of lease and unlawful detainer 
claims, the claims sufficiently overlap to justify awarding attorney fees for the entire litigation. 
See Jorgensen's Inc. v. Ogden City mall Ca, 2001 UTApp. 128f 28,26 P.3d 872 (awarding 
attorney fees on conspiracy to defraud claim because it significantly overlapped with the breach 
of lease claim). Therefore, the Court finds that the lease provision providing for attorney fees 
and costs applies to the entire litigation or alternatively, to the extent there are claims separable 
3 
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from the lease, the claims sufficiently overlap to justify awarding attorney fees and costs on all 
the claims. 
Mr. Truong also contends that an award of costs should not exceed those costs recognized 
by Rule 54(d). However, Utah law is clear that where a contract awards costs, then the award 
should include any costs that were incurred in association with the litigation and iire not limited 
to costs recognized under Rule 54(d). See Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404 \ 20, 38 P.3d 1001 
(holding that in order to avoid making a contractual provision for costs superfluous, contractual 
costs should include those costs that axe "associated with the litigation, but would' not be 
included under a regular Rule 54(d) cost award.")- Therefore, the Holmes are entitled to all costs 
reasonably incurred in the litigation. 
The Court must now determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs that 
should be awarded to the Holmes. Although Mr. Troung does not heavily dispute the 
reasonableness of the fees other than to state the Holmes have not provided sufficient evidence to 
support them, a "court's determination of reasonableness is not bound by the prevailing party's 
affidavit of expenses." Anryx v. Columbia House Holdings, Inc., 2005 UT App. 118 ^ 3,110 
P.3d 176. "Rather, the court may consider a variety of factors, including, 'the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attomeys'in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number 
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the 
4 
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amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved,"' Id. (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988). 
This lawsuit was filed on September 30,2004. The Complaint asked for damages in the 
amount of at least $280,000 plus specific performance of an option agreement to purchase 
property for $463,000. The substantive motions and pleadings that have been filed since then 
have included a motion to dismiss the original complaint, a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, an answer and counterclaim, a motion for partial summary judgment, a motion for 
order of attachment in aid of lessor's lien, a motion for order of restitution, and a motion to strike 
affidavit. In addition to these documents, various proposed orders and affidavits have also been 
filed. The Court finds that the above motions were reasonable and assisted in the timely 
disposition of this case. The Court also finds that Steven Call's ("Mr. Call") hourly rate is within 
the range customarily charged in this locality. In addition, Mr. Call is an experienced attorney 
and has prosecuted the case well. This is evidenced by the fact that the Holmes have prevailed 
on virtually all of their claims and defenses. 
Although the subject matter of the lawsuit has not been complex or has involved novel 
legal questions, Mr. Truong has added to the expense of the litigation by attempting at various 
times to reargue matters that have already been litigated This most recently occurred in Mr. 
Troung's opposition to the Holmes' motion for supplementary damages. 
5 
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Despite the above review, the Court's task in determining reasonable attorney fees is 
difficult because Mr. Call's affidavit does not state the time involved witii each part of the 
litigation or even with the litigation as a whole. Rule 73(b)(2) requires an affidavit supporting an 
award of attorney fees to contain "a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work 
performed.,. / ' Although Mr. Call's affidavit provides descriptions regarding the work 
performed, the affidavit does not provide any information on the time it took to perform that 
work. 
However, in the Holmes' reply memorandum, Mr. Call attached invoices showing the 
time spent on each matter, The Court has reviewed these invoices in detail and finds that they 
are generally reasonable. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court notes that there aire a few items 
in the invoices that are not supported and will not be awarded, For example, the Holmes claim 
$729.20 for copying expenses, but neither Mr. Call's affidavit nor the invoices indicate what 
these copying costs were for or how they were calculated. The Holmes undoubtedly had copying 
costs throughout the litigation, but the Court is unwilling to award these full costs vdthout further 
support Therefore, the Court is only awarding the Holmes $300>00 in copying costs. 
In addition, on Invoice No.334462 and Invoice No. 346230, there are charges from L. 
Essig amounting to $315.00. It is not known who L. Essig is or how he was involved in the case. 
However, because Mr, Call's affidavit states that only he and a paralegal Carrie Hurst worked on 
the case, the Court is not going to award the $315.00 in attorney fees attributed to L. Essig. 
6 
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Finally, it appears that in Invoice Nos, 344909,346230, and 344909, Mr, Call gave a discount to 
the Holmes. The total of these discounts is $390.90. However, despite these discounts, the 
Holmes are seeking to recover the full amount of the invoices before the discounts. This Court 
will not award the Holmes* attorney fees that they ultimately did not pay. Therefore, the Court 
will subtract the discounts in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees. 
Aside from those items noted above, the Court finds that the Holmes' requested fees and 
costs axe reasonable. Therefore, after making tihe above adjustments noted by the Court, the 
Court will award the Holmes's requested costs in the amount of $2,174,99* and attorney fees in 
the amount of $42,695.01 for a total award of $44,870.00. 
II. Motion to Set Bond and Release Attachment 
On November 7,2005, the Holmes filed a Motion for Attachment in Aid of Lessor's Lien 
Pursuant to U.C.A, § 38-3-4* The Holmes had obtained a lien under § 38-3-1, which provides a 
lessor's lien clfor relit due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon the 
leased premises," Section 38-3-3 provides that "[w]henever any rent shall be due and unpaid 
under a lease, or the lessee shall be about to remove his property from the leased premises, the 
lessor may have the personal property of the lessee which is upon the leased premises and subject 
to such lien attached without other ground for such attachment," Section 3 8-3-4 explains the 
1
 The Holmes have the total costs as $2,605,00, but the invoices show that costs are 
actually $2,604.19. Therefore, the Court's aw r^d of costs is calculated by using the latter 
amount 
7 
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requirements to obtain the attachment. On February 1,2006, Judge Leslie Lewis granted the 
Holmes' motion for attachment, 
Mr. Truong thereafter filed the current motion before the Court, the Motion to Set Bond 
& Notice of Filing of Bond. Mr. Truong posted a bond for $150,000 and asked the Court to 
release the attachment pursuant to § 38-3-7, which allows for the release of attached property 
where a bond is posted. Subsequently, the Court entered a ^ vvritten post-judgment order declaring 
that "aft non-exempt personal property of counter-defendant Truong, which was on the Leased 
Premises on February 1,2006 or brought upon the Leased Premises thereafter, is aid remains 
impressed with a judicial lien to the fullest extent provided by law to secure obligations owing by 
counter-defendant Truong to the Landlords..." 
The first dispute among the parties is whether the order of attachment applies to property 
on the leased premises that belongs to corporations where Mr. Truong is a shareholder. This 
dispute is settled by the plain language of § 3 8-3-3 and the Court's previous rulings. The lien 
and subseqtient attachment only applies to the "personal" property of Jbfa* Truong, If there is 
property on the premises that belongs to a corporation, it is not the personal property of Mr. 
Truong and therefore is not covered by the Court's previous jrulings or by § 38-3-3, The Holmes 
cite no authority for attaching property that does not belong to the lessee nor has there been any 
claim of fraud or alter-ego by Mr. Truong or by the corporations to which he is a shareholder. 
However, if there is any question as to who owns certain property that was or is on ihe premises, 
8 
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Mr. Truong will have the burden to show that the property is legally owned by another entity and 
not himself. 
The second dispute between the parties is the amount of bond that should be set under § 
38-3-7. The Holmes contend that the bond should be sufficient to cover all of the Holmes' 
damages under the lease. Conversely, Mr. Truong alleges that § 38-3-7 only requires an amount 
to cover the amount of unpaid rent. The Court agrees with Mr, Truong. The statutory provisions 
for a lessor's lien and attachment repeatedly make clear that the lien and attachment are only for 
the amount of unpaid rent In light of this fact, there is no basis for requiring a bond in an 
amount higher than the amount of unpaid rent and the Court will set the bond at that amount 
In this Court's Order granting summary judgment, die amount of unpaid rent awarded for 
the period through October 1,2005 was $60,000. On November 15,2006, this Court awarded 
$35,000 in supplemental rent damages for the period from November 2005 to when Mr. Truong 
vacated the premises in May 2006. Therefore, the total amount of unpaid rent is $95,000 and the 
bond is set at that amount- Because this amount has already been filed with the Court, the 
attachment on Mr. Truong's personal property attached pursuant to § 38-3-7 is hereby ordered 
released.2 
2
 However, this Order only applies to attachments granted under § 38-3-4. There may be 
other attachments or potential attachments that are available to the Holmes with regard to the 
same property* 
9 
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HL Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond 
Mr. Truong filed a Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond on June 5,2006 pursuant to Rule 
62QX1)- Rule 62(j)(2)(A) states that "the presumptive amount of a bond for compensatory 
damages is the amount of the compensatory damages plus costs and attorney fees, as applicable, 
plus 3 years of interest at the applicable interest rate," The Court finds that the presumptive 
amount is sufficient and will set the bond according to Rule 62QX2)(A). The amoiunt of damages 
awarded in the Holmes' partial summary judgment was $111,057.00. $8,329.28 will be added to 
this amount for interest through August 1,2006 for a total of $119,3 86.28. The amount of 
damages awarded in the Holmes' Motion for Supplemental Damages was $128,073.00, 
$4,500.00 will be added for interest through August 1,2006 for a total of $132,573,00. 
Combining these two amounts, the total thus far is $251,959.28. 
To this amount, the award of attorney fees and costs of $44,870.00 will also be added for 
a total of $296,829.28. To this amount, interest for three years at 6.36% will be added pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-4(3), which amounts to $56,635.02. Finally, $20,000.00 will be added 
to cover reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal. The amount for the supersedeas bond will 
therefore be set at $373,464.30. Because Mr. Truong has already deposited $150,000 with the 
Court, Mr. Truong need only post an additional bond of $223,46430, Once Mr. Truong has 
posted the additional bond, Mr> Truong will be granted a stay to file an appeal. 
10 
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DATED this 2$ day of November, 2006. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Attorney 
Fees, Costs, and Amount of Bond, to the following, this 2?l day of November, 2006: 
Steven W. Call 
Attorney for Defendant 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID TRUONG, 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, 
v, 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES 
Civil No. 040920717 
Hon. Sjepbetr L.Henri 
"frWhg 
The Court, having considered the Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental 
Damages filed by Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes, counter-ptaintifLs and Landlord 
("Landlords"), having considered the memorandum of points and authorities and affii 
in support and opposition to the Motion, having also considered the Court's prior P; 
ftfeSS1^ 0tf*nd*nf t Motion for 
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Summary Judgment made in Landlords* favor against David Truong for his unlawful detainer, 
and for other cause appearing, the Court makes its determination of undisputed material facts, 
conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The Court heretofore granted Landlords* earlier Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgmeni wherein it determined that counter-defendant Truong ("David Truong*) was liable in 
unlawful detainer. Based thereon, the Court awarded damages in the amount of SI 11,057.77 
plus attorneys* fees and costs to Landlords. 
2. On August 31,2005, Landlords fifed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Supplemental Damages (the "Motion"), The Motion was supported by a memorandum of points 
and authorities, the Affidavit of Bruce Holmes and other matters of record. Landlords* Motion 
was filed because David Truong failed to vacate the Leased Premises despite the Court's prior 
ruling that he was in unlawful detainer. 
3. David Truong filed a memorandum in opposition to Landlords* Motion. In the 
memorandum, David Truong does not controvert paragraphs 1,2,3> 4,5,6,7> 8> 9,10 or 16 
therein but attempts to dispute paragraphs 11 through 15. 
4. Paragraphs 12 and 14 relate to whether Truong was required to purchase 
insurance on the property. At the hearing! the Landlords waived any claim to insurance thereby 
eliminating any alleged dispute pertaining to insurance. 
5. In his opposition memorandum David Truong attempts to dispute paragraphs 12 
and 13. The paragraphs read as follows: 
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[11] Tmong has never paid any of the property taxes on the [Leased PremisesJ which 
were owing under the Lease. Consequently, Truong owes property taxes for 2005 
together with interest and penalties in the amount of approximately $14,561* 
[13-] Truong also owes property taxes for the period of January 1,2006 to May 30, 
2006 until he vacated the Leased Premises, The taxes proposed by the Salt Lake County, 
if there are no budget changes for 2006, art 510,357,62, Thus, on a prorated basis, 
Truong owes taxes in an amount no (ess than S4,315.76 (i.e,t 5/12 x 10*357*62) for the 
period of January 1
 v 2006 through May 30,2006. 
6. David Truong responds to paragraph 12 by contending that he does not owe 
property taxes for 2005 and the first five month of 2006 because his obligation to pay those taxes 
arose from the Lease which was terminated. David Truong does not dispute that he did not pay 
the taxes but contends he had no legal obligation to pay the taxes despite that he remained in 
possession of the Leased Premises. The legal argument, which the Court has rejected, does not 
create a disputed question of fact 
7. Landlords* paragraph 15 asserts that Landlords have continued to incur attorneys' 
fees and costs in this ongoing litigation including fees and costs pertaining to David Truong's 
failure to vacate the Leased Premises, By its Order on Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Amount of 
Bond entered November 23,2006, the Court heretofore ruled on the amount and reasonableness 
of Landlords' attorneys9 fees and costs thereby eliminating any dispute as to the reasonableness 
of those fees and costs. 
8. Because David Truong remained in possession of the Leased Premises after 
October 31,2005, Landlords are seeking further judgment against David Traong for holdover 
rent of $35,000 for the seven month period from November 2005 to May 2006 and for treble 
damages of $70,000 for that same time period. 
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9. The facts are undisputed that David Truong made only three payments, to 
Landlords since the Lease was made. On about October 3,2003, he paid check number 934 in 
the amount of $60,000 which paid the first year's rent under the Lease. He also paid at that time 
a $30,000 security deposit required by the Lease. The only other payment made by David 
Truong was check number 1292 in the amount of $ 1,459 for the partial reimbursement of 
insurance. 
10. David Truong has never paid any of the property taxes on the Property which he 
agreed to pay under the Lease. Consequently, David Truong owes property taxes for 2005 
together with interest and penalties in the amount of 514,561. David Truong also owes property 
\a% s for the period of Januaiy 1,2006 to May 30,2006 until he vacaied the Property. The taxes 
proposed by the Salt Lake County (if ihere are no budget changes for 2006) are $10,357.62. 
Thtr -*n a prorated basis* David Truong owes property taxes for 2006 in an amount of $4,315.76 
(i.e., 5/12x10,357.62). If the 2006 taxes are subsequently reduced by the County below the 
foregoing pro-rata amount, this Judgment shall be reduced for that decrease accordingly. 
11. Because David Truong did not vacate the Leased Premises and for other reasons, 
Landlords have continued to incur attorneys' fees and costs. 
12. On August 31,2005* Landlords filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Supplemental Damages ("Motion1*), supporting memorandum, and Third Affidavit of Bruce E. 
Holmes. 
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13. The Motion seeks a fitrther money judgment for supplemental damages including 
base rent, property taxes, and treble damages incurred as a result of Tniong's continued unlawful 
detainer of the Leased Premises, 
14. David Tniong occupied the Leased Premises from October 2003 through May 31 > 
2006. During that time, David Truong made only three payments to Landlords in (he amount of 
$91,459.00 which consisted of $60,000 in rent, $30,000 in a security deposit and $1,459 for the 
partial reimbursement of insurance expense associated with the Leased Premises. 
15. David Tniong did not make Lease Payments lor the period of holdover of ftom 
November 2005 through May 2006. The total rent due for this period is $35,000 (7 x $5,000). 
The treble damages on the foregoing amount is 570,000 (7 x $10,000), 
16. Landlords are seeking a supplemental money judgment against David Tniong for 
the additional rent, treble damages and properties taxes owing by David Truong which were not 
included the Court's Partial Summary Judgment 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon this Court's Partial Summary Judgment and the (incontroverted facts, the 
Court concludes as follows: 
17. The Landlords' Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages should 
be granted for the grounds set forth in Landlords' moving papers. 
1S. The Court heretofore determined in its Partial Summary Judgment that David 
Truong was in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises and that determination constitutes the 
law of this case as to David Truoog's liability in unlawful detainer. 
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19. The issues before this Court relate to supplemental damages suffered by 
Landlords as a result of David Truong's continued unlawful detainer of the Leased hemises and 
his failure to pay property taxes during the time he was in unlawful detainer of the Leased 
Premises. 
20. David Truong has not legally controvert paragraphs 1,2,3> 4,5, 6,7f 8f 9,10 and 
16 of Landlords* support memorandum as required by Ulah R. Civ. P. 7 (c)(3)(B), those facts are 
deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 as a mailer of law. 
21. While David Tniong responds to paragraphs tl,12,13,14, and 15, the response 
fails to raise a material question of fact precluding summary judgment for the following reasons. 
The alleged dispute as to payments regarding insurance in paragraphs 11 and 14 was eliminated 
when Landlonto waived lhat part of their claim at the hearing before the Court. In David 
Truong*$ response to paragraph 12 and 13, David Truong also fails to raise a material question of 
fact because he does not dispute that he did not make the payments but only that he was not 
legally obligated to pay those taxes as a tenant in unlawAil detainer. The Court concludes that 
David Truong was obligated to pay those taxes during the time he was in possession of the 
Leased Premises pursuant to the original Lease terms and that his unlawful detainer of the 
Leased Premises did not relieve him of that obligation. 
22. Concerning paragraph 15, the Court concludes that Landlords have continued to 
incur attorneys7 fees and costs in this ongoing litigation which they are entitled to recover 
pursuant lo the Lease made between the parties. By its Order on Attorneys Fees. Costs, and 
Amount of Bond entered November 28, 2006f the Court heretofore ruled upon the reasonableness 
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of those attorneys' fees and costs incurred through the time period covered by that application. 
Landlords may seek additional attorneys' fees and costs which they have incurred since ibe 
original application for attorneys' fees and costs was made by complying with Utah R. Civ. P. 
73. David Truong may respond to any such affidavit pursuant to the provisions of Rule 73. 
23, Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78*36-3(l)(a), i4(I) a tenant of real property, for a 
tenn less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: (a) when be continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified tenn 
or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by 
express or implied contract* or whether written or oral, shall be terminated, without notice at the 
expiration of the specified term or period." 
24. David Truong became liable in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises as a 
matter of law when he refused to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-10T the Court should assess the damages 
resulting to the Landlords from David Truong's unlawful detainer. Notwithstanding the Court's 
prior ruling that the Lease and Option were the controlling documents, David Tmong failed to 
pay any rent for 2005 or to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease. Even if 
the Lease had not been legally terminated by the Landlords as a result of David Truong's failure 
to pay rent, the Lease expired by its own terms on October 1,2005 pursuant to the Lease § I, p. 
1. Under § 13 of the Lease, David Truong agreed that Landlords were entitled to immediate 
possession of the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease, 
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25, Judgment should also be entered for treble damages in the amount of $70,000 
arising after the termination of the Lease based upon the reasonable rental value of (he Leased 
Premises. Utah Law provides for the trebling of damages including rent which arose after David 
Tniong became liable in unlawful detainer. See Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137,292 P. 206 
(1930); Monroe. Inc. v. SidwelL 770 P,2d 1022 (1989), 1025-1026 (Utah App-1989). 
26. The Landlords are also entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' ftes pursuant 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) because the Landlords have incurred attorneys* Tecs in enforcing 
the Lease made between the parties. 
27, This judgment should be made immediately executable pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78*36-10 which provides that **[ii] the proceeding is for unlawful detainer the payment of 
the rent, execution upon (be judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the 
judgment, In all cases the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately." 
28. Pursuant to Landlord's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court 
heretofore certified its Partial Summaiy Judgment as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), 
Because this Summaiy Judgment concludes Landlords' claims for rent, treble damages and 
property taxes against David Truong. the Court should certify this judgment final pursuant to 
Utah. R- Civ, P. 54(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 so that Landlords may pursue collection 
of the Judgment for the amounts owing. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
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Based upon the uncontrovertcd material facts and conclusions of law, the Court makes its 
order and judgment in favor of Bruce E Holmes and Joan W. Holmes against defendant David 
Truong as follows: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment on Supplemental Damages filed by 
Landlords is hereby granted. 
2. Judgment is made that David Truong is liable to Landlords for his unlawful 
detainer of the Leased Premises* 
3. Judgment is hereby made in favor of Landlords against David Truong in the 
amount of SI 23,876.76 which consists of $35,000 in rent, $70,000 in treble damages and 
$18,876,76 in property taxes. 
4. Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Landlords in the 
amount of 514,179.24 in prejudgment interest, 
5. Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor olXandlords for 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the enforcement of this Judgment. Counsel for 
the Holmes may submit to this Court an attorneys* fee affidavit containing the information 
required by Utah R Civ. P. 73(b) (2), Any objection to the affidavit shall be filed with the Court 
within 10 days after service of the affidavit The Court will make a separate order augmenting 
this Judgment by the amount of attorneys' fees and costs determined by the Court to be 
reasonable. 
6. This Judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate provided for by law until paid. 
BK 8473 PG 7327 
6.2003 3:47PM RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 3013281738 NO. 6727 P. 23 /39 
7. This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the 
Clerk of the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or Utah 
DATED this / y day of FeJjwaW, 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
. l£vSC(Vrr THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY 
AZ-pe m OWGi/NAL DOCUMENT ON FJl£ 
^ < & J H p THIRD DISTRICT COURT 8ALT 
Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4). 
» V " 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES was served via first class mail on thed* 
day of February, 2007 by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage 
prepaid, to the following; 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, L.C. 
P.O. Box 95921 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway Suite B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
911(54 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID TRUONG, 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES 
Civil No. 040920717 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having considered the motion for partial summary judgment filed by counter-
defendants Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes and having considered the memorandum of 
points and authorities and affidavits filed in support and opposition thereto and the Court's prior 
rulings in this case and for other cause appearing, the Court makes its findings, conclusions and 
order of partial summary judgment as follows: 
FINDINGS 
The Court makes the following findings based on documentary evidence received by the 
Court, the Court's prior rulings in the case, and based facts that have not been lawfully 
controverted and are deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
1. Bruce E. Holmes and Joan Holmes (hereinafter the "Landlords") are husband and 
wife who own a commercial building located at 1050 State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (the 
"Leased Premises"), which is the subject of this action. 
2. David Truong ("Truong") is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. On September 25, 2003, the parties entered into a written lease agreement (the 
"Lease") pertaining to the Leased Premises. A copy of that Lease was presented to and received 
by the Court. 
4. In connection with the Lease, the parties made and entered into a written option 
agreement (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"), which was attached as sub-exhibit B to the 
Lease. 
5. The Option sets forth the terms and conditions which Truong needed to comply 
with in order to exercise the Option to purchase the Leased Premises. 
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6. After the Lease and Option were made between the parties, Truong took 
possession of the Leased Premises as a tenant. At about that time Truong paid to the Landlords 
$60,000 for the first year's rent and a $30,000 security deposit. 
7. When the deadline for electing to make the Option arrived, Truong was in breach 
of the Lease by failing to pay the property taxes, failing to obtain a performance bond, and for 
making unauthorized changes to the Leased Premises. He was also in breach the Lease for 
failure to purchase and maintain insurance on the Leased Premises even though he paid one 
reimbursement check to the Landlords. 
8. The deadline under the Option for making the election to purchase the Leased 
Premises expired on August 2, 2004 and no election to purchase the Leased Premises was made 
by Truong before that date. 
9. On August 19, 2004, the Landlords' counsel sent a letter informing Truong that 
he had not made a timely election to exercise the Option which was to be made between July 27, 
2004 and August 2, 2004. 
10. On September 1, 2004, Truong's counsel sent a letter to Landlords' counsel in 
which Truong purported to make an election to exercise the Option to purchase the Property. 
11. Because Truong's letter was untimely and because Truong was in default under 
the Lease, he could not make an election to purchase the Property. 
12. On September 30, 2004, Truong filed a complaint in this action against the 
Landlords. The complaint alleged three claims for relief including promissory estoppel, specific 
performance and unjust enrichment. 
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13. After the complaint was filed, the Landlords moved to dismiss the complaint. 
After the motion to dismiss was briefed by the parties, a hearing was held on April 28, 2005. On 
June 29, 2005, this Court made its written Memorandum Decision in which the Court ruled, in 
part, as follows: 
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court reiterates its initial 
ruling during the hearing that the terms of the Option Agreement are 
unambiguous. The Court also concludes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy these 
terms because he did not provide written notice of his election to purchase the 
property until one month after the deadline for exercising the option. Further, 
even if the plaintiff had sought to timely exercise the option, it appears that he 
could fhot do so because he was potentially in default under the Lease. Next, the 
statute of frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promise to 
convey the property which is inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In 
addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never 
finalized. Instead, the parties entered into a Lease and Option Agreement, which 
clearly supersedes any prior agreements. To the extent that the plaintiff now 
claims mistake or fraud in the inducement, no such allegations appear in the 
Complaint. Finally, since there is a written agreement governing the terms for 
conveying the property, the plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment related to the 
purchase of that property similarly fails. 
Memo. Dec, p. 3. 
14. Despite this Court's rulings that the Lease was the controlling document between 
the parties, Truong still failed to comply with the Lease including the payment of $60,000 in rent 
which became due on October 10, 2004. 
15. On July 22, 2005, the Landlords gave formal written notice to Truong that Truong 
had breached the Lease by failing to pay $60,000 in rent and demand was made upon Truong to 
pay the rent together with accrued interest in the amount of $4,684.93. 
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16. Despite the notice of default given to Truong under the Lease, Truong still failed 
to pay the rent owing to the Landlords. Truong also failed to cure other defaults under the Lease 
including but not limited to the payment of property taxes owing to Salt Lake County. 
17. On August 9, 2005, the Landlords gave written notice to Truong to quit or pay 
rent in compliance with Utah law. Despite service of the notice to quit or pay rent, Truong still 
failed to pay the rent owing to the Landlords. He also failed to vacate the Leased Premises and 
failed to cure other defaults including the payment of property taxes owing to Salt Lake County. 
18. The Landlords moved the Court for an order of partial summary judgment against 
Troung for some of the amount owing to them. 
19. The facts are undisputed that at least the following amounts were due and owing 
by Truong to the Landlords at the time the Landlords' motion partial for summaiy judgment was 
filed: 
Rent through 10/1/2005 $60,000.00 
Interest on rent through 10/1/2005 6,000.00 
Amount to treble rent from 7/26/05 to 10/1/05 21,612.90 
Interest on treble rent from 7/26/05 to 10/1/05 390.81 
Property taxes for 2004 6,283.78 
Interest and penalties on property taxes through 7/26/05 424.11 
Property taxes prorated for 2003 1,189.30 
Interest and penalties on property taxes through 7/26/05 156.87 
Holdover Rent / damages from 10/01/05 to 10/31/05 5,000.00 
Amount to treble damages from 10/01 /05 to 10/31 /05 10,000.00 
Total $111,057.77 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
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20. The Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment for amounts owing to them 
by defendant Truong through October 31, 2005 should be granted as a matter of law. 
21. There are no material facts which have been duly controverted which would 
preclude the entry of a partial summary judgment against Truong. In their opening 
memorandum, the Landlords presented 30 paragraphs of facts in support of their motion. Truong 
did not dispute paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, or 21. 
22. Truong contended that he disputed paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 22, and 30, 
however, the Court concludes that the foregoing alleged disputes fail to preclude an order of 
partial summary judgment against him for the following reasons: 
First, paragraphs 4 and 5 provide as follows: 
[4.] In connection with the Lease, the parties made and entered into a written option 
agreement (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"). The Option Agreement was attached 
as sub-exhibit B to the Lease, and a copy of the Option is attached hereto as Exhibit 1-B. 
[5.] The Option sets forth the terms and conditions which Truong needed to comply 
with in order to exercise the Option to purchase the Leased Premises. 
Truong attempts to dispute the foregoing statements by claiming that they are inconsistent with 
the parties' oral agreement. However, Truong's statement is contrary to the plain and 
unambiguous terms of the Lease and Option which clearly superseded any alleged prior oral 
agreement. 
23. Next, Truong attempts to dispute paragraph 7 which reads as follows: 
1
 While Huong does not specifically dispute paragraphs 22-30, he disputes any implication that he owes any rent for 
the propeity because the property should have been titled in his name based upon the alleged oral agreement ie)ected 
by the Court 
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[7.] When the deadline for electing to exercise the Option arrived, Truong was in 
breach of the Lease by failing to pay the property taxes, failing to purchase and maintain 
insurance, failing to obtain a performance bond, and for making unauthorized changes to 
the Leased Premises. 
Truong responds by contending that even if the foregoing defaults did in fact exist, 
written notice of each of those defaults was necessary to preclude Truong's exercise of the 
Option. However, the Option language does not require that such advance notice be given. 
Rather, the Option f 3 states that "this option may not be exercised while there exists any 
uncured material default under the 'Lease'". 
24. Truong also purports to dispute paragraph 10 which pertains to whether he timely 
responded to the Landlord's written letter, dated August 19, 2004. However, the alleged dispute 
is not relevant to the Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment. 
25. Truong also purports to dispute paragraph 13, which provides as follows: 
[13.] Because Truong was in default under the terms of the Lease and because 
no election to purchase the Leased Premises was timely made within the time required by 
the Lease, Truong was not entitled to purchase the Leased Premises. 
Truong argues that he made a timely election to purchase the Property. However, 
Truong's legal argument is contrary to this Court's prior ruling that Truong's letter was not 
timely and that Truong could not make the election to purchase the Property because he was in 
material default under the Lease for failing to purchase and maintain insurance, failing to pay the 
property taxes, failing to obtain an improvement bond and for making unauthorized alterations to 
the Property. 
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26. Concerning paragraph 22, Truong argues that he was granted leave to amend his 
complaint. However, the Court's ruling granted Truong leave to amend his complaint to see if 
he could state a viable claim for unjust enrichment or a similar claim for the reimbursement of 
expenses for improving the Property. The Court did not eviscerate its prior rulings with the 
respect to the enforceability of the Lease and Option. 
27. Truong has also attempted to dispute Paragraph 30 which states as follows: 
[30.] Pursuant to its terms, the Lease expired no later than October 1, 2005. 
Despite the expiration of the Lease and this Court's two rulings concerning the Lease, 
Truong has refused to vacate the Leased Premises. 
Truong disputes that the prior rulings required him to vacate the Leased Premises. The 
argument is based upon Truong's argument that the parties had a prior oral agreement despite the 
written Lease and Option made between the parties. This Court previously ruled that "the statute 
of frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promise to convey the property which is 
inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC [real 
estate purchase agreement] between the parties was never finalized. Instead, the parties entered 
into a Lease and Option Agreement, which clearly supersedes any prior agreements." Memo. 
Dec, p.3. 
28. Notwithstanding the Court's prior ruling that the Lease and Option were the 
controlling documents, Truong failed to pay any rent for 2005 or to vacate the Leased Premises 
upon termination of the Lease. Even had the Lease not been legally terminated by the Landlords 
as a result of Truong's failure to pay rent, the Lease expired by its own terms on October 1, 2005 
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pursuant to the Lease § 1, p. 1. Under § 13 of the Lease, Truong agreed that the Landlords were 
entitled to immediate possession of the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease. 
29. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(a), "(1) a tenant of real property, for a 
term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: (a) when he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified tenn 
or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by 
express or implied contract, or whether written or oral, shall be terminated, without notice at the 
expiration of the specified term or period." 
30. Truong became liable in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises as a matter of 
law when he refused to vacate the Leased Premises upon termination of the Lease Accordingly, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10, the Court should assess the damages resulting to the 
Landlords from Defendant's unlawful detainer. 
31. Judgment should also be entered for tremble damages arising after the termination 
of the Lease based upon the reasonable rental value of the Leased Premises. Utah Law provides 
for the trebling of damages including rent which arose after Mr. Truong became liable in 
unlawful detainer. See Forrester v. Cook, 11 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); Monroe, Inc. v. 
Sidwell, 770P.2d 1022(1989), 1025-1026 (Utah App. 1989) 
32. The Landlords are also entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees against 
Truong pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) because the Landlords have inclined attorneys' 
fees in enforcing the Lease made between the parties. 
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33. This judgment should be made immediately executable pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-10. 
34. The Landlord's motion to have this judgment certified final pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b) should also be granted because there is no just reason for delaying execution of this 
Judgment. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, the Court makes its order of partial 
summary judgment in favor of Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes against defendant David 
Truong as follows: 
1. Bruce and Joan Holmes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1), it is hereby declared that David 
Truong has forfeited any and all interest in the Lease. 
3. Judgment is hereby made against David Truong that he is liable in unlawful for 
having failed to vacate the Leased Premise upon termination of the Lease. 
4. A partial money judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce 
and Joan Holmes in the amount of $111,057.77 for rent, interest and damages as itemized above. 
Bruce and Joan Holmes may move the Court by way of motion for an additional judgment for 
other damages and amounts owing by David Truong to the Landlords. 
5. Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce and Joan 
Holmes for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this action through October 31, 2005. 
Counsel for the Holmes shall submit to this Court an attorneys' fee affidavit containing the 
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information required by Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). Any objection to the Affidavit by David 
Truong shall be filed with the Court within 10 days after service of the Affidavit. The Court will 
make a separate order augmenting this Judgment by the amount of reasonable fees determined by 
the Court. 
6. This Judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate of interest provided for by law 
until paid. 
7. This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the 
Clerk of the Court without delay pursuant to Rule 54(b) and/or pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-10(4). 
DATED this tlT day of September, 2006. 
BY THE COURT. 
T^BRLESLIE A. LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Shawn D. Turner, 
Attorney for David Truong 
D 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BRUCE E. AND JOAN W. HOLMES was served via first 
class mail on the 16th day of June, 2006 by depositing the same with the United States Postal 
Service, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, L.C. 
P.O. Box 95921 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway Suite B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
882966/swc 
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STEVEN W. CALL (5260) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Telefax: (801) 532-7543 
E-Mail scall@rqn.com 
Attorneys for Bruce E. Holmes and Joan W. Holmes 
SPILED OeSTBICT SU'-a; 
Third Judicial District 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID TRUONG, 
Truong, and Counter-Defendant 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants, and Counter-Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
AND FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
PERTAINING THERETO 
Civil No. 040920717 
Hon. Leslie A. Lev/is 
(filed electronically) 
The Court having considered Bruce and Joan Holmes' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint, dated August 23, 2005. and having considered the memorandum of points 
and authorities filed in support and opposition thereto and for cause appearing, the Court makes 
its findings, conclusions and order of dismissal as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. On or about September 25, 2004, the parties entered into a written lease 
agreement (the "Lease" or "Lease Agreement").1 
2. The Lease pertains to property located at 1050 South State Street in Salt Lake 
City which consists of a corner lot on the west side of State Street and a small business building 
located thereon (the "Property"). 
3. In connection with the Lease, the parties entered into a written option agreement 
dated September 26, 2003 (the "Option" or "Option Agreement"). The Option Agreement was 
attached as an exhibit to the Lease. 
4. The Option Agreement sets forth the conditions which David Truong (hereinafter 
the "hereinafter "Plaintiff or "Truong") needed to perform to exercise the Option. Under the 
Option Agreement, the parties expressly agreed the Option could be exercised only upon the 
following conditions: 
[3.] Exercise. This option may be exercised only not earlier than September 25, 2004, 
and not later than October 1, 2004. Optionee must deliver notice to Optionor delivered or 
mailed by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to Optionor's address set 
forth in Paragraph 11, at least 60 days prior to the date of the exercise of the Option, and 
the intended payment to Optionor of the purchase price itemized herein. Notwithstanding 
anything else herein, this option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured 
material default under the "Lease" which is attached to this Option Agreement as an 
exhibit. 
1
 Truong paid the first year's lent in the amount of $60,000. 
2 
Option Agreement, f 3 (emphasis added). 
5. The parties also agreed in the Option Agreement that in the event the Option was 
not exercised, neither party would have any further rights or claims against the other. 
6. After the Lease and Option Agreement were made, Truong took possession of the 
Property as a tenant under the Lease. During the course of the Lease, Truong did not exercise 
the Option according to its terms and the Option expired. 
7. After the Option expired, Bruce E and Joan Holmes (hereinafter the "Landlords"), 
through their counsel, gave written notice to Truong on August 19, 2004 that the Option had 
expired according to its terms. 
8. More than two weeks after the foregoing letter was sent, Truong's counsel wrote a 
letter to Landlords' counsel on September 1, 2004 stating that Truong was giving 30 day written 
notice of Truong's election to exercise of the Option to purchase the Property. Landlords 
responded that the Option had expired pursuant to its terms. 
9. On September 30, 2004, Truong filed his original complaint against the Landlords 
alleging three claims for relief, including equitable estoppel, specific performance, and unjust 
enrichment. In the complaint, Tmong alleged that the September letter was the operative letter 
preserving the election to purchase the Property. 
10. In response, Landlords moved the Court to dismiss the complaint on several 
grounds. 
11. A hearing on the Landlords' motion to dismiss was held before the Court on April 
28, 2005. After a hearing on landlords' motion, the Court made its Memorandum Decision, 
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dated June 29, 2005, which provided, in part, as follows: 
After considering the parties' respective arguments, the Court reiterates its initial ruling 
during the hearing that the terms of the Option Agreement are unambiguous. The Court 
also concludes that the Defendant failed to satisfy these terms because he did not provide 
written notice of his election to purchase the property until one month after the deadline 
for exercising the option. Further, even if the Defendant had sought to timely exercise 
the option, it appears that he could not do so because he was potentially in default under 
the Lease. Next, the statute of frauds precludes the Defendant from relying on any oral 
promise to convey the property which is inconsistent with the Option Agreement. In 
addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never finalized. 
Instead, the parties entered into a Lease and Option Agreement, which clearly supersedes 
any prior agreements. To the extent that the Defendant now claims mistake or fraud in 
the inducement, no such allegations appear in the Complaint. Finally, since there is a 
written agreement governing the terms for conveying the property, the Defendant's claim 
of unjust enrichment related to the purchase of that property similarly fails. 
Memo. Dec, p. 3. 
12. The Court's further ruled that its "Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order 
of the Court, dismissing the plaintiffs claims for specific performance and promissory estoppel 
and permitting the plaintiff to amend his unjust enrichment clam or to add a new claim pertaining 
to the reimbursement of the renovation expenditures." At no time since the commencement of 
this action did Truong file a motion for leave to amend his complaint. 
13. On May 12, 2005, after the briefing and hearing on the Landlords' motion to 
dismiss were completed but prior to the Court's written ruling, Truong filed a motion to 
supplement the record. The motion sought leave to submit the Affidavit of Andy Truong (the 
"Affidavit"), and the documents attached thereto. 
14. The Affidavit provides, in part, that Andy Truong, ('Truong's brother"), received 
a letter from Landlords' counsel regarding Truong's default in the payment of insurance. Andy 
4 
Truong contends that he answered the letter on January 17, 2004. Andy Truong attached a photo 
copy of two documents to the affidavit. 
15. The first document purports to be a letter dated January 17, 2004 that Truong 
asserts his brother, Andy Truong, sent to the Landlords , (the "Truong Letter"),. The Truong 
Letter provides as follows: 
My name is Andy Truong. I am David's brother and partner. I'm writing this in 
response to your letter on 1-9-04 concerning the insurance on the building. David is out 
of the country for about six weeks and he just asked me to response your letter. He 
indicated that he talked to you before he left the country about the insurance situation that 
the building is too old and all the electrical is not up to codes to be insure [sic]. You had 
agreed to keep yours [sic] insurance and we would reimbursed [sic] you. Here is the 
check for $1,459 for invoiced amount. Concerning your letter on terminate [sic] the 
lease, we all know that David is ready to make the purchase with cash from day one but 
willing [sic] to postpone for a year to help your taxes and federal lien situations. 
Just to let you know, we will pay you the full amount as agreed in September to 
complete the transaction. If you refer, we can give you the full amount next month to 
finalize on this whole deal but you would first need to satisfy all you [sic] state and 
federal tax liens. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at 359-2479. 
Thanks, 
[no signature] 
Andy Troung 
for David Troung 
16. While the Landlords received the referenced check, they have no record of having 
received the Truong Letter. 
17. The Truong Letter was sent in response to a January 9, 2004 demand letter sent to 
Truong by Landlords' counsel which provided: 
As part of the lease agreement signed by you on September 25, 2003, you agreed to 
purchase public liability insurance and insurance on the building during the entire term of 
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the lease agreement. See Section 30 of the Lease Agreement. In addition, Section 30 
requires that you provide the Lessor duplicate originals or certificates of insurance for the 
insurance policies. Mr. Holmes sent you a request on November 30, 2003 reminding you 
of this obligation. As noted in the November 30, 2003 letter, because of your failure to 
comply with the insurance requirements, Mr. Homes was required to purchase the 
insurance to protect the building. Please remit payment for the insurance acquired by Mr. 
Holmes plus 10% interest. Should you continue to ignore this request, we will terminate 
the lease. As noted in the option agreement, the option may not be exercised while 
there exists any uncured material default under the Lease. We view your failure to 
purchase the insurance as a material default under the lease and hereby provide 
notice to you. Please take the necessary steps to correct this default immediately. . . . 
IS. The foregoing Demand Letter was sent to Truong by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, and the Truong letter acknowledges its receipt. 
19. The Landlords filed an Objection to and Motion to Strike the Affidavit and Exhibit 
Attached Thereto on June 2, 2005. 
20^ On June 29th, 2005, the Court granted the Landlords' motion to dismiss on various 
grounds. However, the Court permitted Truong to file an amended complaint to see if he could 
allege a valid claim for unjust enrichment or a new claim pertaining to the reimbursement of the 
renovation expenses. 
21. On August 1, 2005, Truong filed his First Amended Complaint ("Amended 
Complaint") with the Court. The amended Complaint alleged claims other those authorized by 
the Court. 
22. On September 6, 2005, this Court made and entered its order denying Truong's 
motion to supplemental and denying the Landlords' objection thereto as moot based upon the 
Court's June 29th written ruling. 
23. On August 23, 2005, the Landlords moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
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with prejudice on various grounds. 
24. On September 27, 2005, the Landlords filed an answer and counterclaim against 
Truong seeking, among other things, to evict him from the Leased Premises. 
25. A hearing was held before the Court on all pending motions on February 1, 2006. 
CONCLUSIONS 
26. The Court concludes that the Landlords' motion to dismiss Truong Amended 
Complaint should be granted. 
27. Truong's Amended Complaint exceeded the bounds granted by the Court which 
limited the scope of Truong's amendment. This Court ruled that its "Memorandum Decision 
will stand as the Order of the Court, dismissing the plaintiffs claims for specific performance 
and promissory estoppel and permitting the plaintiff to amend his unjust enrichment clam or to 
add a new claim pertaining to the reimbursement of the renovation expenditures." 
28. The Amended Complaint filed by Truong was not in compliance with the Court's 
order and Truong's unilateral actions in filing an Amended Complaint, which went beyond the 
scope of the amendment permitted by the Court, was improper. Truong did not seek or obtain 
leave of the Court to file amendments to his complaint which exceeded the boundaries permitted 
by the Court. 
29. Truong's effort to supplement the record after the briefing and hearing before the 
Court had been completed was improper. Truong did not present anything to the Court 
suggesting that the Truongletter qualified as newly discovered evidence or that the Letter could 
not have been presented to the Court in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court denied 
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Truong's motion to supplement the record. 
30. Despite this Court's ruling and despite Truong's prior position in his original 
complaint that the Option was exercised by his September letter, Truong alleges in his Amended 
Complaint that the Option may have been exercised by the Truong Letter dated January 17, 
2004. However, even had the Court permitted Truong to amend his complaint, the Letter 
presented by Truong's brother could not have effectively operated to make an election to 
exercise the Option for the following reasons. 
31. Truong was in default under the Lease. The Option, paragraph 2, provides that it 
may not be exercised while there exists any uncured material default under the "Lease". See 
Lease, 1|3, 
32. Truong was in default under Lease because he failed to purchase and maintain 
insurance as required by the Lease. Indeed, after Truong failed to purchase insurance, the 
Landlords sent a letter to Truong on November 20, 2003. The letter informed Truong that the 
Lease, f 30, required Truong to pay for the insurance. After Truong failed to pay the insurance, 
Landlords caused their attorneys to forward the January 9, 2004 Demand Letter to Truong. The 
Demand Letter stated that Truong was in default for failing to obtain insurance. The letter also 
stated that Truong's default would preclude an exercise of the Option stating, "[a]s noted in the 
option agreement, the option may not be exercised while there exists any uncured material 
default under the Lease. We view your failure to purchase the insurance as a material default 
under the lease and hereby provide notice to you." Notwithstanding the foregoing, Truong still 
failed to purchase and maintain insurance on the Property. 
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33. Truong was also in default under the Lease for failing to pay the property taxes on 
the Property. The Lease §19 provides that "[property taxes on the Leased Premises shall be the 
responsibility of Lessee." The facts are undisputed that Truong did not pay the taxes in 2003 and 
2004. In fact, Landlords were compelled to pay delinquent taxes on the Property in the amount 
of $12,208.40 as reflected by the Redemption Certificate presented to the Court. 
34. Truong was also in default under the Lease for making unauthorized alternations 
to the Property. The facts are undisputed that Truong made changes to the Property that were 
unauthorized. Truong's statement at the hearing that Landlords eventually became aware of the 
unauthorized changes did not operate to alter the Lease term that no changes could be made 
without the Landlords' written consent. 
35. Truong was also in default under the Lease because he never obtained a 
performance and completion bond for any of the improvements made to the Property as 
mandated by the Lease, 1f 7. 
36. Even had Truong not been in default under the Lease, the Truong Letter was 
insufficient under the Utah Statute of Frauds to create a binding obligation for the purchase of 
real property under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides, in relevant part, that no estate 
or interest in land may be created unless the act to create that interest is in writing and subscribed 
(i.e., signed) by the party purporting to create the interest. The Andy Truong Letter is not signed 
by anyone. 
37. Any instrument required by the Utah Statute of Frauds to be signed by a party 
may be executed by an agent provided the agent is authorized in writing to sign the document. 
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See also Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986). There is no allegation in the 
Amended Complaint that Andy Truong was authorized in writing to exercise the Option to 
purchase the Property. 
38. Furthermore, even had Andy Truong been given written authority to exercise the 
Option, the plain language in the Truong Letter does not purport to legally bind Truong to 
purchase the Property. Rather the Letter simply contains self serving statements which seem to 
suggest that the parties had orally agreed to amend the Lease on the issue of insurance and 
indicating further that "we will pay you the full amount as agreed in September to complete 
transaction." 
39., Even Truong did not believe that the Truong Letter operated to exercise the 
Option because he caused his attorneys to send the letter purporting to exercise the Option on 
September 1, 2004 as alleged in Truong's original complaint. 
40. In addition, the Letter was not properly mailed to the Landlords. The Option, % 9, 
provides that "[a]ny notice under this Agreement shall be delivered or sent by certified or 
registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, and addressed as follows: To Optionor: 
Bruce Holmes, 2476 E. Charros Rd., Sandy, Utah 84092. Id. ^9. The Option, paragraph 3, 
similarly provides that "Optionee must deliver notice to Optionor delivered or mailed by 
certified or registered mail, return receipt requested to Optionor's address." Id. f 3. There is no 
allegation that the Truong Letter was sent by certified or registered mail as required by the 
Option. 
41. In addition, in the Letter Andy Truong states that he is Truong's partner, however, 
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there is nothing in the Lease or Option which makes any reference to a partnership or which 
provides that Andy Truong was a party to the Lease or the Option. 
42. The Court also determines that the Landlords' alleged representations that the 
Lease and Option Agreement would not be enforced would themselves have to be in writing in 
order to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
43. Furthermore, the suggestion made in the Truong Letter that there was an oral 
modification made to the Lease relating to Truong's obligation to obtain insurance is barred by 
the parole evidence rule and the written terms of the Lease as a matter of law. The Lease, 
paragraph 37, which addresses modifications, provides that "[a]nY modification or amendment of 
this agreement shall be in writing and shall be executed by all parties." Id. (emphasis added). 
Also, the Lease, paragraph 28, pertaining to parole evidence, provides that the Lease "cannot be 
modified or amended in any way except in writing signed by the Lessor and Lessee." Id. 
Consequently, any allegation that the Truong Letter should be received for the puipose of 
reflecting an oral modification to the Lease is barred as a matter of law. 
44. Truong's Amended Complaint also fails to state a claim for fraudulent 
inducement. To state a claim for fraud, Truong must plead, as follows: (1) That a representation 
was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
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Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982) (quoting, Pace v. Parrish, 247 
P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952)). If any of the foregoing elements is not satisfied, the claim must 
fail. (Id.) Truong's alleged claim of fraudulent inducement fails for numerous reasons. 
45. Truong cannot enter into the Lease, and then claim that he was defrauded because 
the Landlords orally represented they would not enforce its terms. Because the parties went to 
the time and expense of preparing a written Lease and Option, the terms of these documents 
should control as a matter of law. 
46. Truong could not reasonably rely on conflicting oral terms when he entered into 
the Lease agreeing that he did not rely upon prior understandings between the parties. Paragraph 
14 of the Lease states: "Entire Agreement. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements 
between the parties with regard to the subject matter hereof and there are no other 
understandings or agreements between them." Option, 1fl63. Truong does not allege that he was 
fraudulently induced to sign the wrong Lease but that he signed the Lease believing that a prior 
oral agreement was the controlling agreement between the parties. 
47. The parties also agreed that the Lease represented a final expression of the 
parties' agreement as follows: Paragraph 28 of the lease provides. 'This instrument constitutes 
the final, fully integrated expression of the agreement between the LESSOR and the LESSEE, 
and it cannot be modified or amended in any way except in writing signed by the LESSOR and 
" This case does not involve an adhesion contract or a lopped sided consumer tiansaction Rather, this involves a 
lease tiansaction between sav\ y business men As such, the Court should not attempt to re-write or enforce alleged 
oial terms which are inconsistent with a written agreement signed by the parties 
See Chnstcnson v Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co , 666 P 2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983) (noting Mikkelson 
"imposed on the buyer a duty of reasonable care to inspect important documents that were part of the transaction 
conveying the property") 
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LESSEE." Lease, [^28. After agreeing that there were no other representations or 
understandings between them, Truong cannot now assert an alleged oral misrepresentation 
inconsistent with his written agreement which would satisfy each of the Mikkelson elements. It 
was further agreed that "Any modification or amendment off [sic] this agreement shall be in 
writing and shall be executed by all parties." Lease T[ 37. 
48. In addition, Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that a claim of fraud be pled with 
specificity and an allegation which is not alleged with particularity does satisfy the Rule. See 
Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, 18 P.3d 1137, 1140. Truong's Amended Complaint fails 
to comply with Rule 9(b) for several reasons. First, the Amended Complaint, f^l| 27-28 alleges 
that the parties first entered into a real estate purchase agreement. However, this Court has 
heretofore ruled that the agreement was never finalized. See Memo. Dec, p. 3. ("In addition, 
there is no doubt that the prior REPC between the parties was never finalized.") Second, the 
statement referring to Landlords that "they conveyed to Mr. Truong that the boiler plate 
provisions contained in the agreement would not be enforced" fails to adequately state the nature 
of misrepresentation that was made, who made the misrepresentation, to whom it v/as made or 
when the representation was made. 
49. Truong's alleged conduct in inducing Truong to sign the Lease and Option was 
also not the proximate cause of Truong's loss. Rather, Truong's failure to purchase the Property 
was caused by Truong's failure to comply with the Lease and Option made between the parties. 
50. The Utah Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that a claim for fraud 
or deceit may not be predicated upon a person's failure to perform an oral promise which is 
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unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 578 (Utah 
1953), ("Nor, as a general rule, can fraud be predicated upon the failure to perform a promise or 
contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, since in such case the promisor has 
not, in a legal sense, made a contract, and hence has the right, both in law and in equity, to refuse 
to perform.") 
51. Thus, if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the requirements of 
the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985). 
52. Accordingly, this Court found that "the statute of frauds precludes the plaintiff 
from relying on any oral promises to convey the property which are inconsistent with the Option 
Agreement." Memorandum Decision, p.3; See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3. 
53. Concerning unjust enrichment, Utah law provides that a claim in unjust 
enrichment does not exist when there is an actual contract covering the subject matter. See, e.g., 
Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract 
is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the litigation."); 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d at 264, 268 ("Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable written or oral contract exists."). At the first hearing before this Court there was 
some uncertainty expressed by Troung's counsel whether the Lease and Option addressed the 
improvements for which Truong was asserting an unjust enrichment claim. Because of the 
uncertainty created by the lack of facts or argument on this point, the Court permitted Truong to 
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amend his Complaint to assert an unjust enrichment or related claim for his renovation expenses. 
54. Having reviewed the Landlords' Motion to Dismiss on this point and Truong's 
response thereto, the Court is satisfied that the Lease does, in fact, expressly address 
improvements on the leased premises by indicating that such improvements became the property 
of the Lessor (i.e., the Landlords) "upon installation." Lease at §7. 
55. Section 7 of the Lease also expressly addresses the issue of improvements and 
renovations to the Property. In fact, the Lease provides that Landlords agreed to the improvements 
identified in sub-exhibit A to the Lease provided Truong obtained a performance and completion 
bond. However, no other renovations or improvements could be made without the Lessor's 
consent. The parties further agreed that "[a]U improvements made by LESSEE to Ihe Premises 
which are so attached to the Premises that they cannot be removed without material injury to the 
Premises, shall become the property of LESSOR upon installation." Lease § 7. 
56. Because the Lease addressed the improvements and renovations to be made to the 
Premises, Truong may not assert a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of law.4 
57. Truong did not dispute that the parties' Lease term had expired and that Truong 
was not current in his lease payments. In fact, counsel's only argument was that Truong was 
entitled to the property because he had timely exercised the Option Agreement. As the Court 
indicated above, this argument is invalid and cannot justify Truong remaining on the Landlords' 
property after the expiration of the Lease, particularly where he has failed to pay rent for an 
4
 E\en if the Lease did not addiess improvements and lenovations (which is does), it is not unjust for defendants to 
retain leasehold impiovements which have become part of the Pioperty because defendants are not letaining money or 
property w hich belongs to another See Berrert \> Ste\ ens, 690 P 2d 553 (Utah 19S4) They agreed that the 
permanent improvements would belong to defendants 
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extended period of time. 
58. In addition, it is compelling that the parties agreed in the Option Agreement, f 5, 
that if Truong "fails to exercise the option, Optionor shall retain the consideration paid for the 
option and neither party shall have any further rights or claims against the other by reasons of 
this transaction." (Option Agreement f 5.) Surely the parties had the power to agree that no 
claims would be asserted against one another if the Option was not exercised. They so agreed 
and the Court will not attempt to rewrite or circumvent the written Option Agreement made 
between the parties. 
59. Paragraph 34 of the Lease provides that Landlords are entitled to the recovery of 
attorneys' fees in enforcing the terms of the Lease and therefore the Court should also award the 
Landlords reasonable attorneys' fees and costs which they have incurred in this action. 
ORDER OR DISMISSAL 
Based upon the foregoing findings, conclusions and this Court's prior rulings in the case 
and for cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY: 
ORDERED that Bruce E. and Joan W. Holmes Motion to Dismiss the amended 
complaint filed by counter-defendant Truong is hereby granted; 
ORDERED that the amended complaint filed by counter-defendant Truong is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice; and 
ORDERED that Judgment is hereby made against David Truong in favor of Bruce and 
Joan Holmes for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this action. Counsel for Bmce and Joan 
Holmes shall submit to this Court an attorneys' fee affidavit containing the information required 
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by Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). Any objection to the Affidavit by David Truong shall be filed with 
the Court within 10 days after service of the Affidavit. The Court will make a separate order 
augmenting this Judgment by the amount of reasonable fees determined by the Court. 
ORDERED that this Order is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by 
the clerk of the Court. „ ^ 
DATED this _l_ day of July, 2006. 
BY THEXOURT: x 
<XCU U Uii^ 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
* * > 
mC% * • - * » ^ * f / 
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rSLEJI JlSiRfCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL . 5 2005 
Deputy Cle"* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID TRUONG, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040920717 
vs. t 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, an individual, : 
JOAN W. HOLMES, an individual, 
JOHN DOES 1-5, i 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on April 28, 
2005, in connection with the Holmes defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the 
matter under advisement to further consider the parties' written 
submissions, the case law alluded to during the hearing and 
counsels' oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules 
as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court notes that the plaintiff's Complaint 
sets forth three claims for relief: Promissory Estoppel (based on 
the defendants' alleged promises to sell certain property to the 
plaintiff, despite "boilerplate language in the Lease and Option 
Agreement); Enforcement of Contract/Specific Performance (based on 
the notion that the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the terms of 
TRUONG V. HOLMES PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the Option Agreement are "non material and inconsequential") and 
Unjust Enrichment (based on the capital improvements made by the 
plaintiff "in contemplation of purchasing the property at the 
earliest time permitted under the Option Agreement"). 
In their Motion to Dismiss, the defendants seek to dismiss 
each of the foregoing claims. First, the defendants argue that the 
parties' Lease and Option Agreement constitutes an integrated 
contract that superceded any prior agreements between the parties 
(including a prior Real Estate Purchase Contract) . Fmrther, since 
the plaintiff failed to exercise his option to purchase the 
property in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Option 
Agreement, the defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiff's claim 
for specific performance. Next, the defendants seek to dismiss the 
plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim on the basis that under the 
statute of frauds, he cannot rely on alleged oral promises to 
convey the property which differ from the written terms of the 
Option Agreement. Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff 
has no claim for unjust enrichment because there is an express or 
implied contract covering this litigation. 
During oral argument, the plaintiff's counsel advanced a 
number of theories for avoiding the implications of his client's 
failure to timely exercise the Option Agreement. Counsel argued 
that the option terms are ambiguous, that a prior REPC requires the 
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defendants to sell the property to the plaintiff irrespective of 
the Option Agreement and that payment for the property, as opposed 
to the mechanics for exercising the option, was the critical factor 
in this case. 
After considering the parties1 respective arguments, the Court 
reiterates its initial ruling during the hearing that the terms of 
the Option Agreement are unambiguous. The Court also concludes 
that the plaintiff failed to satisfy these terms because he did not 
provide written notice of his election to purchase the property 
until one month after the deadline for exercising the option. 
Further, even if the plaintiff had sought to timely exercise the 
option, it appears that he could not do so because he was 
potentially in default under the Lease. Next, the statute of 
frauds precludes the plaintiff from relying on any oral promises to 
convey the property which are inconsistent with the Option 
Agreement. In addition, there is no doubt that the prior REPC 
between the parties was never finalized. Instead, the parties 
entered into the Lease and Option Agreement, which clearly 
supercedes any prior agreements. To the extent that the plaintiff 
now claims mistake or fraud in the inducement, no such allegations 
appear in the Complaint. Finally, since there is a written 
agreement governing the terms for conveying the property, the 
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plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment related to the purchase of 
that property similarly fails. 
While making the foregoing ruling, the Court notes that during 
oral argument it became apparent that a significant component of 
the plaintiff's claims related to the large sums of money he 
expended in renovating the defendants1 property. The Court has 
concluded above that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as to 
the purchase of the property fails because there is already a 
written agreement in place which governs this issue. However, it 
is not clear that the parties' agreements specifically address the 
issue of renovations and payment for the same, in the event that 
the option is not exercised. The defendants suggest in their Reply 
that the Option Agreement does address this possibility by 
providing that "the Optionor shall retain the consideration paid 
for the option and neither party shall have any further rights or 
claims against the other by reason of this transaction." A 
preliminary reading of this provision suggests that it pertains to 
the original amounts tendered by the plaintiff and not to 
subsequent payments that he may have incurred in renovating a 
property that he now cannot own. If indeed the parties have no 
written agreement addressing the renovation issue, it is plausible 
that the plaintiff may have an unjust enrichment claim as to his 
renovation expenses. However, since the plaintiff's curirent unjust 
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enrichment claim only touches upon this issue, the Court is 
inclined to permit him to amend his Complaint in order to provide 
additional detail on this aspect of his unjust enrichment claim or 
to add any new claim which may provide the basis for reimbursing 
the plaintiff for his expenditures. To be fair, the Court will 
permit the defendants to file a renewed Motion to Dismiss with 
respect to any new or amended claim. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance and 
promissory estoppel and permitting the plaintiff to amend his 
unjust enrichment claim or to add a new claim pertaining to the 
reimbursement of the renovation expenditures. 
Dated this >—T/day of June, 2) 
A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
• ^ ••• "
v
- ' \ 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of 
their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty 
or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any 
contract or obligations made before May 14,1981. 
Amended by Chapter 79, 1989 General Session 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-36-1 "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation 
or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any 
real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing 
conduct the party in actual possession. 
1953 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate enforcement -
Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in 
favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided 
in Section 78-36-10.5 . If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure 
to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property 
is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's 
default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendants tenancy, if waste is alleged in the 
complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment 
of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-
38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the 
amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c), and for 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
1994 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7, The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion, If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted, It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief Is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. 
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, 
and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits, When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable, Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made In bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12, Defenses and objections. 
(a) when presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of 
the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days 
after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A 
party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a 
reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless 
the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these 
periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, 
but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect 
the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones Its disposition until the trial on 
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of 
the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the moire definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one Is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading If a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection 
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party Is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings, The defenses specifically enumerated (1 )-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial, 
(e) Motion for more definite statement, If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before Interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired, If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike, Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any Insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the 
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to 
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection 
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in 
the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(I) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the 
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver 
of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may 
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court 
of the reasonable necessity therefore, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a 
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs 
and 
charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required 
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking 
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion 
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Kerry L Knighton appeals a trial court 
judgment awardmg him damages for Vickey A. 
Bowers's breach of the parties' agreement (the 
agreement) to transfer certain real property (the 
property). We affirm. 
First, Knighton argues that the trial court erred by 
denying him specific performance of the agreement 
because real property, by its nature, is unique and, 
therefore, he is entitled to the remedy of specific 
performance. We review a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny specific performance under an abuse 
of discretion standard. See Morris v Sykes, 624 
P2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) "Specific performance 
is an equitable remedy, and accordmgly, the trial 
court is granted wide discretion m applying and 
formulating it." LHIW, Inc v DeLorean, 753 P 2d 
961, 963 (Utah 1988) 
Specific performance is available when the contract 
mvolves property which is unique or possesses 
special value; real estate is assumed to possess that 
necessary quality. Thus, specific performance is the 
presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to 
transfer real property . However, the availability of 
the remedy of specific performance of an agreement 
to sell land is not a matter of right, but depends 
upon an evaluation of .. equitable considerations. 
71 AmJur.2d Specific Performance § 133 (2001) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In essence, Knighton argues that he is entitled to 
the remedy of specific performance as a matter of 
right, based solely upon the fact that the subject 
matter of the agreement was real property Knighton 
is correct in asserting that real property is assumed 
to be unique for purposes of specific performance 
and that specific performance is the presumed 
remedy for the breach of an agreement to sell real 
property. See id However, the nonbreaching party 
is not entitled to specific performance as a matter of 
absolute right. See id Rather, the trial court, after 
evaluating equitable considerations, see id, is 
"granted wide discretion" m determining whether 
the nonbreaching party is entitled to that remedy. 
DeLorean, 753 P 2d at 963. Accordingly, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Knighton the remedy of specific performance solely 
because the subject matter of the agreement was 
real property. 
Second, Knighton argues that the trial court erred 
by ruling that he did not have clean hands in 
seeking the equitable remedy of specific 
performance. See id (stating that "a party seeking 
equity must do so with clean hands") The record 
reveals that although the trial court used the phrase 
"clean hands" m a portion of its ruling from the 
bench, the trial court used the phrase as a reference 
to Knighton's delay in bnngmg suit against Bowers, 
not as a literal reference to the clean hands doctrine. 
See id It is noteworthy that the phrase "clean 
hands" was not used in the trial court's written 
ruling. The record shows that Knighton brought his 
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suit against Bowers in November 2000, and 
Knighton does not challenge the trial court's 
determination that Bowers breached the agreement 
in December 1996. Knighton's delay of nearly four 
years in bringing suit against Bowers was an 
appropriate consideration for the trial court in its 
determination as to whether Knighton was entitled 
to specific performance. See 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific 
Performance § 115 (2001) ("[Specific 
performance may ... be refused on the separate and 
distinct ground of laches or default by the plaintiff 
in bringing an action to enforce the contract; in an 
action to specifically enforce a contract, the one 
seeking enforcement must act promptly." (footnote 
omitted)). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by using this delay as a factor in its 
decision to deny Knighton specific performance of 
the agreement, even though its reference to "clean 
hands" was somewhat wide of the mark. 
Page 2 
ruling, the trial court stated that Knighton was not 
"entitled to an award of lost rents ... which occurred 
after the breach was declared in December 1996.'" 
The trial court's determination that evidence of 
damages during the relevant period was inadequate 
is supported by the record, is not "manifestly 
unjust," and is within the trial court's "broad 
discretion." Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Knighton damages for lost rents. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
2004 WL 797560 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 102 
END OF DOCUMENT 
*2 Third, Knighton argues that the trial court erred 
by determining that Bowers did not have clear title 
to the property at the time of trial. However, 
contrary to this argument, the trial court did not 
conclusively make such a determination. In its 
written ruling, the trial court stated that Bowers 
"may not have clear title to the property." This does 
not amount to a conclusive determination that 
Bowers did not have clear title to the property at the 
time of trial. Nevertheless, even if we were to 
assume that this was a conclusive determination and 
accept Knighton's assertion that it is clearly 
erroneous, he does not provide us with any legal 
authority or analysis to support his conclusory 
assertion that absent this error, he would have been 
entitled to specific performance of the agreement. 
Therefore, we decline to address this argument 
further. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (stating 
that rule 24(a)(9) requires an argument to contain 
"reasoned analysis based on [legal] authority"). 
Finally, Knighton argues that the trial court erred 
by denying him damages for lost rents. "In fixing 
damages, the trial court is vested with broad 
discretion, and the award will not be set aside 
unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the 
trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was 
unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous 
circumstances." Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 
682 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 1984). In its written 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS. 
*1 Plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen appeals the denial of 
her motion to amend her complaint and the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant. We 
reverse. 
A party may amend a pleading by leave of the 
court, "and leave shall be freely given when justice 
so requires." Utah R.Civ.P. 15(a). "Leave to amend 
a pleading is a matter within the broad discretion of 
the trial court and we do not disturb its ruling unless 
appellant establishes an abuse of discretion 
resulting in prejudice." Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct.App .1988). In reviewing a 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
amend, we consider the timeliness of the motion, 
the justification for delay, and the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. See Swift Stop, 
Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). Although motions raised late during 
litigation are disfavored, a motion to amend raised 
in response to facts discovered after a prior 
pleading "should be allowed if there is a reasonable 
explanation for the delay in discovering the facts 
and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the 
opposing party." Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820. 
The trial court made no findings regarding the 
denial of plaintiffs motion to amend, and the record 
before us does not disclose why the trial court 
denied plaintiffs motion. Although plaintiffs 
motion came long after this litigation commenced, 
pi&inXiffs delay is seasonably explained because 
defendant did not produce its purported original 
release-which precipitated plaintiffs new 
claims-until three years after this litigation 
commenced. 
Additionally, the record reflects no failure by 
plaintiff to conduct discovery that would have 
resulted in the timely production of the release. Cf. 
Chadwick 763 P.2d at 820 ("An untimely motion to 
amend is inappropriate where the only excuse for its 
untimeliness is the moving party's failure to conduct 
discovery."). Defendant's Answer to plaintiffs 
Complaint, as well as the discovery pursued by 
defendant, focused on the cause, nature, and extent 
of plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff had no reason to 
believe that the defendant would rely on a purported 
release. 
Finally, whatever prejudice, if any, defendant may 
suffer from plaintiff amending her complaint is 
self-inflicted in that defendant had the capacity to 
produce the release earlier. We therefore hold that 
the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
plaintiffs motion to amend. 
We likewise conclude that the trial court erred by 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
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law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because plaintiffs 
affidavits and proposed amended pleadings raise 
genuine issues of material fact bearing on 
fraudulent inducement and alteration of the 
release, summary judgment for defendant was 
inappropriate. 
*2 The trial court concluded that the best evidence 
and parol evidence rules prevented consideration of 
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent 
and the scope and content of their agreement. We 
disagree. 
The best evidence rule provides that the original 
writing is required to prove the content of such 
writing. See Utah R.Evid. 1002; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-25-16 (1996) ("There can be no other 
evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the 
writing itself, except in the following cases...."). 
The trial court erred by relying on these provisions 
in that plaintiff does not dispute the content of the 
release produced by defendant. Rather, plaintiff 
claims that defendant either fraudulently induced 
her into signing the release or fraudulently altered 
the release. The best evidence rule has no 
application to the admissibility of plaintiffs 
evidence supporting these claims. 
In the absence of fraud or other invalidating 
circumstance, the parol evidence rule excludes 
evidence of contemporaneous agreements that 
contradict the terms of an integrated, unambiguous 
written contract. See, e.g., Hall v. Process 
Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 
(Utah 1995). However, "before considering the 
applicability of the parol evidence rule ..., the court 
must first determine that the parties intended the 
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question 
of fact, any relevant evidence is adrnissible" Id. 
(emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs affidavits and motion to amend her 
complaint raise the issue of whether the release 
reflected the parties' intended agreement. Thus the 
trial court erroneously excluded plaintiffs parol 
evidence. See Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 
663, 665-66 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, "[p]arol evidence is adjuissible to prove 
that a party was induced into a contract by fraud, 
despite a determination that a writing is an 
integrated contract." Id. at 666. Plaintiffs affidavits 
are thus admissible to show fraudulent inducement 
and alteration and, along with the proposed 
amendment to her complaint, raised genuine issues 
of material fact concerning those claims. See id. 
Because summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, defendant was not entitled to summary 
judgment. 
We reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
GREENWOOD, A.P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
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